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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78A-3-102(j)(2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES/PRESERVATION
A.

Do provisions of the Utah Enabling Act and Utah Constitution pertaining to

state school trust lands preclude the application of statutes of limitations when the State
acting as trustee seeks to recover possession of state school trust lands wrongfully
diverted from the corpus of the trust? R. at 560-63.
1.

Standard of Review:

When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn from them are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonprevailing party, here the State. Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting Inc., 116 P.3d
271 (Utah 2005). "The district court's legal decisions are granted no deference on
summary judgment and the court reviews them for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann
Soffe Trust, 100 P.3d 1200 (Utah 2004).
B.

Is this case substantively distinguishable from the holding of the Utah

Supreme Court in Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 199 P. 670 (Utah 1921), involving the
identical statute of limitations? R. at 560-63; 762-65.
1.

Standard of Review:

When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn from them are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonprevailing party, here the State. Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting Inc., 116 P.3d
1

271 (Utah 2005). "The district court's legal decisions are granted no deference on
summary judgment and the court reviews them for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann
Soffe Trust, 100 P.3d 1200 (Utah 2004).
C.

Did the District Court err in entering Summary Judgment for

Defendants/Appellees on the basis that they held under "color of title" by virtue of the
1912 patent (which had undisputedly been adjudicated void in 1926) and the subsequent
tax sale by Carbon County, without first considering the invalidity of thel912 patent and
the disputed tax sale? R. at 549-54; 1136.
1.

Standard of Review:

When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn from them are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonprevailing party, here the State. Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting Inc., 116 P.3d
271 (Utah 2005). "The district court's legal decisions are granted no deference on
summary judgment and the court reviews them for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann
Soffe Trust, 100 P.3d 1200 (Utah 2004).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
I.

Utah Constitution
a. Article X, section 5 of the Utah Constitution, provides in pertinent part:
(1)
There is established a permanent State School Fund which
shall consist of revenue from the following sources:
(a) proceeds from the sales of all lands granted by the United
States to this state for the support of the public elementary
and secondary schools;
(b) • • •
(c) . . .
2

(d) all revenues derived from the use of school trust lands;
(e)...
(2)
...
(d)
The State School Fund shall be guaranteed by the state
against loss or diversion.
(3)
There is established a Uniform School Fund which shall
consist of revenue from the following sources:
(a) interest and dividends from the State School Fund;...
(4)
The Uniform School Fund shall be maintained and used for
the support of the state's public education system as defined in
Article X, Section 2 of this constitution and apportioned as the
Legislature shall provide.
As enacted at statehood, article X, section 5 read:
The proceeds of the sale of lands reserved by an Act of Congress,
approved February 21st, 1855, for the establishment of the
University of Utah, and of all the lands granted by an Act of
Congress, approved July 16th, 1894, shall constitute permanent
funds, to be safely invested and held by the State; and the income
thereof shall be used exclusively for the support and maintenance of
the different institutions and colleges, respectively, in accordance
with the requirements and conditions of said Acts of Congress.
b. Article XX, section 2:
Lands granted to the State under Sections 6, 8, and 12 of the Utah
Enabling Act, and other lands which may be added to those lands
pursuant to those sections through purchase, exchange, or other
means, are declared to be school and institutional trust lands, held in
trust by the State for the respective beneficiaries and purposes stated
in the Enabling Act grants.
As enacted at statehood, article XX read:
All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter be granted to
the State by Congress, and all lands acquired by gift, grant or devise,
from any person or corporation, or that may otherwise be acquired,
are hereby accepted, and declared to be the public lands of the State;
and shall be held in trust for the people, to be disposed of as may be
provided by law, for the respective purposes for which they have
been or may be granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired.
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II.

Federal Statutes
a. Section 6 of the Utah Enabling Act, Act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107,
provides in pertinent part:
That upon the admission of said State into the Union, sections
numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two, and thirty-six in every township
of said proposed State . . . are hereby granted to said State for the
support of common schools.
b. Section 10 of the Utah Enabling Act, Act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107,
provides in pertinent part:
That the proceeds of lands herein granted for educational purposes ..
. shall constitute a permanent school fund, the interest of which only
shall be expended for the support of said schools, and such land shall
not be subject to pre-emption, homestead entry, or any other entry
under the land laws of the United States, whether surveyed or
unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for school purposes only.
c. Act of January 25, 1927, Chapter 57, §1, 44 Stat. 1026 (the "Jones Act"),
codified as amended at 43 USC § 870 (1956), provides in relevant part:
Subject to the provisions of subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section, the
several grants to the States of numbered sections in place for the support or
in aid of common or public schools be, and they are, extended to embrace
numbered school sections mineral in character, unless land has been
granted to and/or selected by and certified or approved, to any such State or
States as indemnity or in lieu of any land so granted by numbered sections.
(a) The grant of numbered mineral sections under this section shall be of
the same effect as prior grants for the numbered nonmineral sections, and
titles to such numbered mineral sections shall vest in the States at the time
and in the manner and be subject to all the rights of adverse parties
recognized by existing law in the grants of numbered nonmineral sections.
(b) The additional grant made by this section is upon the express
condition that all sales, grants, deeds, or patents for any of the lands so
granted shall hereafter be subject to and contain a reservation to the State of
all the coal and other minerals in the lands so sold, granted, deeded, or
patented, together with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the
same. The coal and other mineral deposits in such lands not heretofore
disposed of by the State shall be subject to lease by the State as the State
legislature may direct, the proceeds and rentals and royalties therefrom to
be utilized for the support or in aid of the common or public schools:
4

Provided, That any lands or minerals hereafter disposed of contrary to the
provisions of this section shall be forfeited to the United States by
appropriate proceedings instituted by the Attorney General for that purpose
in the United States district court for the district in which the property or
some part thereof is located.

III.

Utah Statutes
a. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2 provides in pertinent part:
The state will not sue any person for or in respect to any real
property, or the issues or profits thereof, by reason of the right or
title of the state to the same, unless:
(1) such right or title shall have accrued within seven years before
any action or other proceeding for the same shall be commenced . . .
(2)...
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to quiet title to a 640-acre section of state school trust land in

Carbon County (the "Subject Land"). The State also seeks an accounting of proceeds
received by the Defendants from their partial disposition of the mineral estate of the
Subject Land. The Defendants/Appellees are individuals and limited liability companies
(collectively described herein as the "Mathises").
In 1912, the State conveyed the Subject Land to a private corporation, the Carbon
County Land Company ("CCLC") for nominal consideration. Subsequent investigation
in the nineteen-teens and -twenties determined that CCLC had obtained this and other
valuable coal lands from the state school trust by fraud. The United States subsequently
successfully sued the State to invalidate the State's title to the Subject Land on the basis
that the lands were of known mineral character at the time of statehood, and thus not

5

subject to transfer. With title to the land having never left the United States, the State of
Utah's sale to CCLC was void ab initio.
By subsequent federal legislation known as the Jones Act, the United States
conveyed title to the Subject Land to the State of Utah, effective January 25, 1927. In
1932, Carbon County purported to sell CCLC's interest in the land for back taxes, and the
Mathises' predecessor acquired that interest from the County by quitclaim deed in 1938.
The State learned in 2002 that the Mathises were leasing the lands to a third party for coal
extraction and subsequently filed this action.
The substantive question presented to the District Court was whether the State of
Utah's after-acquired title in the mineral estate of the Subject Land flowed to CCLC - the
State's patentee under the void 1912 patent - when the State first acquired the land from
the United States in 1927. The State contends that as a matter of law the void 1912 state
patent - by law no more than a quitclaim deed - could not support after-acquired
title/estoppel by deed, and that the Mathises did not have the required privity in any event
to assert estoppel, given the root of their claims in a tax sale. Without after-acquired title,
the tax sale upon which the Mathises' claim to title is based was unquestionably void,
since title to the Subject Land had always been in either the United States or the State,
and the property was thus exempt from taxation.
The parties did not dispute relevant facts concerning the original sale of the
Subject Property, the United States' invalidation of the State's title, the Jones Act, and
the subsequent Carbon County tax sale. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the
District Court declined to rule on the after-acquired title issue, except necessarily by
6

implication (as discussed herein), or the State's claims that the tax sale, which is the
foundation of the Mathises' claims to title, was void because the land was at all times
exempt from assessment. Instead, it held that the statute of limitations contained in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-2 (2007) barred the State from maintaining this action. The District
Court's Final Order and Judgment was entered on November 27, 2007, and this appeal
followed.
The State contends that the statute of limitations contained in section 78-12-2 may
not constitutionally be applied to bar the State from recovering land wrongly diverted
from the corpus of the state school trust. This argument is based on the decision of the
Utah Supreme Court in Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 199 P.2d 670 (Utah 1921), which
held that the identical statute of limitations was inapplicable to bar an action by the State
with respect to school trust lands because such an application of the statute would violate
the Utah Constitution. The District Court distinguished Van Wagoner based on its legal
conclusion that the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis in Van Wagoner was limited
to the facts of that case, which rested upon a claim of adverse possession. In doing so,
the District Court relied on the admittedly void 1912 patent and the subsequent tax sale;
the District Court's opinion stated: "Here the State made a conveyance of the property
issued by patent and the Mathises acted under color of title based on that patent and the
tax sale that flowed there from for more than 70 years." R. at 1136; Final Order attached
hereto at Addendum A.
The State seeks reversal of the District Court's Order and Final Judgment because
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2 is not applicable to this action by the State in its capacity as
7

trustee of the trust created by article X, section 5 and article XX, section 2 of the Utah
Constitution. The State respectfully requests that the case be remanded to the District
Court with direction to enter judgment quieting title to the Subject Land in the State.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Statehood Grants of School Trust Lands
Utah achieved statehood in 1896 pursuant to the Utah Enabling Act. Utah
Enabling Act, Act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107, Preamble. In the Utah Enabling Act,
Congress granted Utah numbered sections 2, 16, 32 and 36 in every surveyed township in
the State for the support of the new state's public schools. Id. at § 6. Proceeds from
these school trust lands constitute a permanent school fund, income from which provides
funding for Utah's K-12 public schools. Id. at § 10; Utah Const., article X, § 5 (2003);
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-16-101.5(5)(a) (2003). The Utah Constitution declares all lands
granted under Section 6 of the Utah Enabling Act for the support of public education to
be held in trust for the purposes for which granted. Utah Const, art. XX, § 2. The Utah
Enabling Act and Constitution impose a trust upon the State of Utah with respect to the
disposition of proceeds from the school trust lands as well as the use of the lands
themselves. National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands, 869
P.2d 909 (Utah 1993). The Utah legislature has codified the State's trust responsibilities
with respect to school trust lands in the School and Institutional Trust Lands Management
Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 53C-1-101 et seq. (2008) (the "Trust Lands Management Act").

8

The Subject Land
The Subject Land is a 640-acre parcel of land in Carbon County, Utah, described
as follows:
Township 12 South Range 10 East, SLB&M
Section 36: All
Appellees Rex Morrell Mathis, Joanne L. Mathis-Ross, William Dale Mathis,
Mark Pickup, Shawnda Pickup Cave, Mathis Land, Inc., a Utah Corporation, Buck
Creek, LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company, Mountain Mineral Resources, LLC, a
Utah Limited Liability Company and John Does 1-10 (collectively the "Mathises") all
claim title to the Subject Land. The Mathises' claim to title in the Subject Land
originates solely from a quitclaim deed from Carbon County to Rex Mathis dated May 3,
1938. Deed at R. at 131; see also Def.'s Op. Mem, xi; R. at 602-603.
The 1905 Sale of the Subject Land
Because the Subject Land was Section 36 of a surveyed township, the State
originally treated the Subject Land as school trust land granted in place by Congress at
the time of statehood pursuant to Section 6 of the Utah Enabling Act. On or about
February 1, 1905, Clarence B. Milner ("Milner") executed an agreement to purchase the
Subject Land and certain other lands from the State of Utah pursuant to State of Utah
Certificate of Sale No. 8500 (the "Certificate of Sale"), which he later assigned to the
Carbon County Land Company ("CCLC"). R. at 19; 599. Pursuant to the Certificate of
Sale, Milner agreed to pay the State the then-standard price of $1.50 per acre for the
Subject Land, as non-mineral grazing lands. R. at 19; 798 (noting, "The price paid by the
9

Milners . . . was $1.50 per acre, the value placed upon grazing lands"). On February 28,
1912, the State of Utah conveyed, without warranty or reservation of any kind, the
Subject Land to CCLC. R. at 21. A federal court later ruled that CCLC and its agents
engaged in "a scheme or conspiracy. .. to fraudulently obtain the ownership" of state
trust lands containing coal resources. Milner v. United States, 228 F. 431, 439 (8th Cir.
1915). In a challenge to the 1915 Milner decision, the Milners filed a later action sub
nom Independent Coal & Coke Co. v. U.S., 21A U.S. 640 (1927), in which the U.S.
Supreme Court concluded that "none of the defendants [CCLC and Milners]... could by
any legal device, however ingenious, acquire title from the state free from the taint of
their fraud." 274 U.S. at 646-47. A 1920 special investigation (the "Mainor & Conniff
Audit") conducted on behalf of then-Governor Simon Bamberger determined that the
Subject Land was one of several properties containing valuable coal resources that had
been obtained from the state school trust by means of fraud perpetrated by CCLC. R. at
871. A second audit (the "Olson Audit") concluded that the CCLC's fraudulent
acquisition of approximately 5500 acres of land at $1.50 per acre amounted to an
"ostensibly a sale of cheap grazing lands" by taking advantage of "at least great
carelessness on the part of the State Land Board in disposing of these lands [referring to
83,887 acres of school trust lands fraudulently acquired by 'dummy' entrymen and
assigned to coal companies]". R. at 798, 792.
The 1912 Patent Declared Void Ab Initio
As enacted, the Utah Enabling Act's school section grant did not contain an
express exception or reservation of mineral lands from the grant. However, the United
10

States Supreme Court subsequently held in United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563 (1918),
that the Utah Enabling Act did not in fact pass title to the State to lands that were known
to be mineral in character at the time of statehood. In the aftermath of the Sweet decision
and the Milner court's finding of persistent land fraud, the United States Department of
the Interior ("DOI"), on June 27, 1924, through the United States General Land Office
(the "United States GLO") directed the Utah General Land Office Register (the "Utah
GLO"), a local administrative arm of the federal agency, to initiate contest proceedings
against the State and its transferees with respect to the Subject Land on the basis that it
was in fact of known mineral character at statehood. R. at 23-27. After hearings before
the Utah GLO in which the State of Utah and CCLC participated, the DOI on September
4, 1926 recommended to the Secretary of the Interior that the claims made by the State
and its transferee, CCLC, be denied because the Subject Land had been of known mineral
character at the time of statehood. R. at 40. On September 8, 1926, the Secretary of the
Interior issued a Final Order adopting the DOFs recommendation, adjudicating the
Subject Land to be of known mineral character at the time of Utah statehood. The
Secretary therefore found that the State's title to the Subject Land was void ab initio,
having remained at all times with the United States rather than vesting with the State. R.
at 461-62. This order adjudicating the State and CCLC's title to be void ab initio was
never appealed and became final. R. at 461. CCLC did not pay property taxes on the
Subject Land subsequent to the Secretary of Interior's Order. See 1932 Tax Deed, R. at
127.
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The Jones Act
In January of 1927, Congress made a conditional grant to the public land states of
additional lands. The new grant consisted of in place school sections that were known to
be mineral in character at the time of statehood, and which had thus not passed under the
original statehood grants. Act of January 25, 1927, Ch. 57 §1, 44 Stat. 1026, codified as
amended in 43 USC § 870-871 (the "Jones Act"). The Jones Act conveyed as an
additional conditional grant both the surface and mineral estate of the Subject Land to the
State of Utah, conditioned upon the perpetual retention of the mineral estate by the State.
Department of the Interior, Instructions (Circular No. 1114) March 15, 1927. R. at 464;
see Jensen v. Dinehart, 645 P.2d 32 (Utah 1982). On July 1, 1929, the United States
GLO transmitted a letter to the Utah GLO Register confirming that title to the Subject
Land had not passed under the Act of July 16, 1894 (the statehood grant) but had passed
to the State under the Act of January 25, 1927 (the Jones Act). R. at 117-20. In 1964 the
United States issued United States patent No. 43-65-0072 confirming that ownership of
the Subject Land passed from the United States to the State of Utah pursuant to the Jones
Act as of January 25, 1927. R. at 121-22. This patent was recorded in the real property
records of Carbon County on November 2, 1964 in Book 92, Page 206.
The After-Acquired Title Inquiry
By letter dated July 17, 1929, to the DOI, the Executive Secretary of the Utah
State Land Board inquired what the effect Utah's after-acquired title statute, Section 4879
of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, had on subsection (b) of the Jones Act. R. at 66062. On January 15, 1930, Mr. John F. Edwards, Assistant Secretary of the Interior,
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responded to the State Land Board's letter on behalf of the DOI to J.F. Mendenhall,
Executive Secretary, State Land Board (the "Edwards Letter"). R. at 773-77. The
Edwards Letter stated:
[W]here title did in fact pass from the State by virtue of its prior patent,
which would only be in instances where the lands involved passed to the
State under its original grant, the act of January 25, 1927, does not affect
such lands and sales and conveyances of the same. This would be true
under long settled rules of the Department as to lands in fact mineral in
character, which had been sold and patented as lands passing under the
original grant, if the lands were not known to be mineral at the time they
were identified by survey, or at the time when the State was admitted to the
Union, if the survey preceded the admission.
Edwards Letter at 2; R. at 774 (emphasis added). It continued: "As to lands, however,
that in fact were known to be mineral in character at the date the State's rights would
have otherwise attached, and which by reason of such knowledge did not pass under the
original grant, the lands pass to the State only by virtue of the act of January 25, 1927,
and the purchasers thereof obtained nothing by their purchases prior to the act" Id.
(emphasis added). The Department further stated that the Jones Act "makes no exception
from the operation of its provisions lands theretofore sold, conveyed or patented by the
State, and certainly there is no room for the construction that it validated the
unauthorized prior sale of known mineral lands" and that the State "by legislation or
otherwise has not power to alienate its title to mineral deposits or consider its previous
conveyances of such minerals as alienations." Edwards Letter at 3; R. at 775 (emphasis
added).
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The Mathises' Claim of Title
Prior to January 25, 1927 (the date of the Jones Act), title to the Subject Land was
vested in the United States. Following the Jones Act, title to the Subject Land was vested
in the State. Neither the United States nor the State was subject to property taxation
pursuant to then-applicable provisions of the Utah Constitution. See Utah Const, art. Ill
(enacted 1895).
On December 21, 1927, the Carbon County Treasurer issued a Certificate of Sale
making a preliminary sale of the Subject Land to Carbon County for unpaid taxes for the
year 1927. See 1932 Auditor's Tax Deed; R. at 307. In May of 1932, the Carbon County
Treasurer issued an auditor's tax deed (the "Tax Deed") to Carbon County, thereby
purporting to make a sale of the Subject Land to the County for unpaid property taxes
assessed in 1927. R. at 306. In 1938, Carbon County quit claimed its interest in the
Subject Land to Mr. Rex Mathis. This quitclaim deed (the "1938 Quitclaim Deed") was
recorded in the Official Records of Carbon County, Utah on May 3, 1938 in Book 3S,
Page 616. R. at 478. The Mathises in this case are the successors in interest to Mr.
Mathis, who died intestate on July 12, 1972.
Subsequent Events
Since the date of the Jones Act, the State has made no conveyance of any interest
in any part of the Subject Land save a mineral lease issued to Andalex Resources, Inc.
("Andalex") on March 1, 2004. R. at 480-98. Effective as of January 1, 1998, the
Mathises entered into a lease for the mining of coal underlying the Subject Land to
Andalex Resources, Inc. (the "Mathis-Andalex Lease"). R. at 500-524. The Mathises
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did not occupy the mineral estate until they entered into the Andalex Lease. Pursuant to
the Mathis-Andalex Lease, Andalex has made payments to the Mathises constituting
lease rental payments, lease bonus payments and advance minimum royalties that
constitute proceeds from the Subject Land. R. at 500-524. The State became aware of
the Andalex Lease in late 2002, and filed this action in April 2005 after conducting due
diligence concerning its potential claim to the Subject Land.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

Statutes of Limitations May Not Be Applied to Prevent Recovery of School Trust
Lands for the Corpus of the School Trust.
The Utah Enabling Act of 1894, 28 Stat. 107, together with Article X, section 5

and article XX, section 2 of the Utah Constitution, created an express trust governing the
management of lands granted by Congress to Utah at statehood for the support of public
education. This trust imposes a "sacred obligation" on the State of Utah to devote the
school trust lands to the purposes for which they were granted by Congress. The Utah
Supreme Court in Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 199 P. 670 (Utah 1921), analyzed the
constitutional scope and nature of this trust and concluded as a matter of law that
ordinary statutes of limitation - specifically including the exact limitations provision at
issue in this case - do not apply to bar actions by the state as to trust lands because the
Utah Constitution imposes an "absolute limitation upon the power of the state to dispose
of such lands, or permit them to be disposed of, except for the purposes for which they
were granted by Congress." 199 P. at 675, 679. Courts in other states that have
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considered this issue have similarly held that the legislature may not statutorily abrogate
the trust or unlawfully divert its assets.
The Court has reaffirmed this principle time and again since Van Wagoner, most
recently in Consolidation Coal Co v. Utah Division of State Lands, 886 P.2d 514 (Utah
1994). There, the Court held that the school trust imposed an absolute limitation on the
State's ability to alter or abrogate its duty to receive "full value" for trust lands, or to
make any disposition of property that conflicts with this duty. In that case, the Court held
that "serious questions" would arise about the constitutionality of a state statute - in that
case the statutory contract interest rate - if it were applied to reduce the returns otherwise
available to the school trust. In the current case, the statute of limitations applied by the
District Court would wholly divest the school trust of a valuable asset. Under the Utah
constitution, as interpreted by Van Wagoner and Consolidation Coal, this is not a
permissible result.
II.

The District Court Wrongly Distinguished Van Wagoner from the
Current Case.
The District Court distinguished Van Wagoner on the basis that it involved

application of limitations to a situation of adverse possession, while it found that the
Mathises had "color of title" by virtue of the void 1912 patent and the subsequent tax
sale. This was error for two reasons. First, under Utah law at the time of Van Wagoner,
the adverse claimant (Whitmore) had color of title by statute, so there was no basis for
the District Court's distinction. Second, review of the case law pertaining to applicability
of limitations to the school trust shows no analytical basis for limiting those cases' effect
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to adverse possession cases; where the issue has been considered, the courts have stated
that the principle extends to all situations where the trust corpus would otherwise be
depleted. There was simply no basis in law for the District Court's legal distinctions.
The Utah Constitution's prohibition of uncompensated loss to the school trust is as
equally applicable to this case as it was in the Van Wagoner case, in particular since the
identical statutory limitation language is at issue.
The District Court also relied upon the Utah Court of Appeals' interpretation of
legislative intent in Trail Mountain Coal Company v. Division of State Lands & Forestry,
884 P. 2d 1265 (Utah App. 1994), to apply the statute of limitations in this case. That
opinion applied statutory analysis to find that the statute of limitations could be applied to
school trust lands where the legislature has broadly included the state in the statutory
limitation. However, none of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals as a basis for
applying the statute to school trust lands actually involved school trust lands - a crucial
distinction in light of the constitutional issues associated with school trust lands. The
Court of Appeals opinion did not address or analyze the constitutional limits on the
legislature's power over school trust lands, but rather relied on a surface application of
the statute.
When Trail Mountain was reviewed by the Supreme Court on certiorari, the State
failed to raise the constitutional issues in its initial brief. The Supreme Court therefore
declined to address the constitutional issue on the merits. Trail Mountain Coal Company
v. Division of State Lands & Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365, 1371, n.l 1 (Utah 1996). This
decision did not in any way disturb Van Wagoner, which remains controlling precedent
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here. The District Court's reliance on the Court of Appeals opinion in Trail Mountain
was therefore error.
III.

The District Court's Reliance on Color of Title and Grant of Summary
Judgment Implicitly Assumes the Validity of the 1912 Patent and 1932
Tax Sale.
Although the District Court specifically declined to rule on the validity of the

Mathises' claim of title arising from the 1912 State Patent and the 1932 Tax Sale from
Carbon County, the Court's conclusion that the Mathises had color of title was premised
upon on the validity of these conveyances to pass title as against the State. This
underlying premise was flawed as a matter of law. The Department of the Interior issued
a final, binding decision in 1926 that the United States owned the Subject Land. The
state, and its prior patentees, owned nothing. This decision was conclusive as to all
future title actions arising from those parties' interests under the statehood grant. The
State of Utah subsequently obtained an entirely new title under the Jones Act of 1927,
subject to the terms of that act.
The United States undisputedly held title to the Subject Land prior to the Jones
Act. The State held undisputed legal title thereafter. The assessment of taxes on the
Subject Land by the county in 1927 could be of no legal effect as to the interests of either
the federal government or the State of Utah under applicable law exempting federal and
state land from assessment. Therefore, the sale of the Subject Land by the county for
taxes assessed while held by either sovereign was void and of no effect as to any interest
of the state. The District Court's reliance on "color of title" for its legal conclusion that
the statute of limitations apply in this case is erroneous. The adversely holding party in
18

Van Wagoner also held under color of title. Utah Compiled Laws § 5034 (1917); now
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4(2)(a). Thus, the 1938 Quit Claim Deed from the
county to the Mathises passed no interest superior to that of the State.
ARGUMENT
I.
SECTION 78-12-2 MAY NOT BE APPLIED
TO THE STATE ACTING IN ITS
CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF SCHOOL
TRUST LANDS
A.

Introduction

The core issue before the Court is whether the 7-year statute of limitations found
at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21 prevents the State, in its capacity as trustee, from suing to
recover school trust lands wrongly diverted from the corpus of the school trust. In Van
Wagoner v. Whitmore, 199 P. 670 (Utah 1921), the Supreme Court held that the statute of
limitations pled in that case (the language of which is identical to section 78-12-2) could
not be applied to the State when acting as trustee of school trust lands. In this case, the
District Court made the legal conclusion that the holding in Van Wagoner did not apply
and ruled that the State's action was time-barred by section 78-12-2. Final Order
attached hereto at Addendum A. The District Court's ruling fails to apply the

1

This statute has recently been renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-201 with

amendments not relevant to this case. H.B. 78, § 639, 57th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2008).

19

constitutional analysis contained in Van Wagoner and other applicable school trust cases,
and erroneously distinguishes controlling precedent.
When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn from them are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonprevailing party, here the State. Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting Inc., 116 P.3d
271 (Utah 2005). "The district court's legal decisions are granted no deference on
summary judgment and the court reviews them for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann
Soffe Trust, 100 P.3d 1200 (Utah 2004).
B.

Utah's School Trust

When Utah and other western states entered the Union, Congress recognized that
the vast areas of untaxable federal public lands in the new states created a serious
impediment to the new states' abilities to support public education through an adequate
property tax base. State of Utah v. Kleppe, 586 F. 2d 756, 758 (10th Cir. 1978), rev 'd on
other grounds sub nom. Utah v. Andrus, 446 U.S. 500 (1980). To rectify this burden,
Congress enacted the federal land grant statutes to create a permanent trust which would
generate financial aid to support the public school systems of the new states. Id. In
return for the land grants, the states covenanted to hold the lands under trust covenants
for the perpetual benefit of the public school systems. Id.
Utah achieved statehood in 1896 pursuant to the Utah Enabling Act. Utah
Enabling Act, Act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107. In the Utah Enabling Act, Congress
granted Utah numbered sections 2, 16, 32 and 36 in every surveyed township in the State
for the support of the new state's public schools. Id. at § 6. Proceeds from these school
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trust lands constitute a permanent school fund, income from which provides funding for
Utah's public schools. Id. at § 10; Utah Const., Art. X, § 5 (2003); Utah Code Ann. §
53A-16-101.5(5)(a) (2003). The Utah Constitution declares all lands granted under
Section 6 of the Utah Enabling Act for the support of public education to be held in trust
for the purposes for which granted. Utah Const. Art. XX, § 2.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Enabling Act grant, coupled
with the State's acceptance of the terms of the grant through the Utah Constitution,
created an express trust binding the State in its use of the lands and funds generated from
the lands. In Duchesne County v. State Tax Commission, 140 P. 2d 335 (Utah 1943), the
Supreme Court stated:
[T]he trusteeship of the fund was vested in the state by the Enabling Act as
a condition of statehood, as a condition to the right of the state to be born,
and imposed on the state at its birth by the instrument of its creation as a
condition of its life as a government.
140 P. 2d at 342.
The Court in Duchesne County held that the land grant was an express
constitutional trust, requiring the State to act as a trustee and guarantor against loss. 140
P. 2d at 337. In National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands,
869 P. 2d 909 (1993), the Supreme Court extensively defined the scope and nature of the
school trust. It concluded that as a trustee, the State was required to act as a fiduciary for
the benefit of the public education system. 869 P. 2d at 917. The State's fiduciary duties
included the duty to act only for the benefit of the beneficiaries; the value of school trust
lands cannot be used to further other legitimate government objectives. Id. This duty of
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loyalty includes an obligation on the State to not act in the interest of a third party at the
expense of the trust beneficiaries. Plateau Mining Company v. Division of State Lands &
Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 728 (Utah 1990).
C.

The Utah Constitution Limits the Legislature's Power to Dispose of Trust
Lands, Including Disposal by Application of Statutes of Limitations.

The trust created by the school land grant and the Utah Constitution creates an
irrevocable duty on the part of the State to receive "full value" from any disposition of its
school trust lands. Consolidation Coal Company v. Utah Division of State Lands &
Forestry, 886 P.2d 514 (1994). The trust thus limits the power of the Utah legislature to
dispose of trust lands for other than full value, including indirectly by limitations. In Van
Wagoner v. Whitmore, supra, the Supreme Court engaged in constitutional analysis
considering the application of a statute of limitations substantively identical to the statute
at issue here:
Section 6446 (Held Inapplicable in Van
Wagoner):

Utah Code Ann. $ 78-12-2:

The state will not sue any person for or in
respect to any real property, or the issues
or profits thereof, by reason of the right or
title . . . to the same, unless:

The state will not sue any person for or in
respect to any real property, or the issues
or profits thereof, by reason of the right or
title to the same, unless:

1. Such right or title shall have accrued
within seven years before any action or
other proceeding for the same shall be
commenced; or,

(1) Such right or title shall have accrued
within seven years before any action or
other proceeding for the same shall be
commenced; or

2. The state or those from whom it claims
shall have received the rents and profits
such real property, or some part thereof,
within seven years.

(2) The state or those from whom it claims
shall have received the rents and profits
such real property, or some part thereof,
within seven years.
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In Van Wagoner, the State and its patentee (Van Wagoner) sought to eject a third
party (Whitmore) from school land that Whitmore had adversely occupied and cultivated
for decades. Whitmore interposed the statute of limitations set forth above. The
Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding statutory language expressly barring the State
from bringing an action where it had not been in possession within seven years, the
statute could not be applied with respect to school trust lands:
This [the constitutional provisions with respect to school lands] ... is an
absolute limitation upon the power of the state to dispose of the lands, or
permit them to be disposed of.... Is it conceivable, in the face of such a
constitutional provision, that the Legislature could have intended its statutes
of limitation to apply to such lands? It is our solemn duty to hold that such
could not have been the legislative intent. When ... we add the further
provision that the state of Utah guarantees the proceeds of these lands
against loss or diversion, thus making itself an insurer and in honor bound
to make good any loss that the schools might sustain by diverting these
lands, or permitting them to be diverted, to other purposes, the conclusion
becomes irresistible that the statutes of limitation have no application to the
land in question.
199 P. 675, citing Murtaugh v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co, 112 N.W. 860
(Minn. 1907).
Courts in other states with school trust lands have similarly concluded that
otherwise applicable statutes of limitation may not be applied to bar recovery by the
school trust. In both State v. Peterson, 97 P. 2d 603 (Idaho 1939) and United States v.
Fenton, 27 F.Supp. 816, 817 (D. Idaho 1939), courts in Idaho ruled that a statute of
limitations could not be applied to prevent the State of Idaho from foreclosing mortgages
securing a loan of trust funds. In Peterson, the Idaho Supreme Court looked to
provisions of the Idaho constitution holding that state's permanent school fund to be
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forever inviolate to preclude application of the statute of limitations to a state-initiated
foreclosure. The U.S. District Court contemporaneously held in a similar case that the
Idaho legislature could not constitutionally enact any statute directly decreasing the
permanent school fund, and therefore could not enact a statute of limitations that brought
about the same result:
The fund is sacred and stands out with that special protection, and any
statute of limitations, whether it relates to the State or not, would not
apply to actions brought by the trustee State for the foreclosure of a
mortgage to secure a loan out of such funds.
27 F. Supp. at 816 (emphasis added). See also Murtaugh, 112 N.W. 860 (Minn. 1907).
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court has confirmed the constitutional
limitations placed on the Utah legislature by the school trust in a case directly analogous
to the one now before the Court. In Consolidation Coal Company v. Utah Division of
State Lands & Forestry, supra, 886 P.2d at 514, a coal company had substantially
underpaid royalties to the Division of State Lands and Forestry, which then managed the
State's school trust lands. The coal lease was silent concerning pre-judgment interest.
Utah law at that time provided that if the contract did not specify a rate of interest, the 6%
statutory pre-judgment rate of interest would apply. See Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2).
The Division argued that a much higher interest rate set by Division rules should apply.
886 P. 2d at 525. It pointed to the fact that, had the royalties been paid on time, the funds
would have been invested in a trust account at a higher rate of interest, and that charging
the 6% statutory rate would result in a loss of value to the trust.
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The Supreme Court agreed. It noted that the State has an irrevocable duty to
receive "full value" from any disposition of school trust lands, citing cases where courts
had invalidated legislative action reducing returns to school trusts. Id., citing Kadish v.
Arizona State LandDep't, 1A1 P.2d 1183, 1196 (Ariz. 1987) (statute fixing flat royalty
rate on trust lands unconstitutional); Oklahoma Education Ass }n v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230,
236-7 (Okla. 1982) (statute establishing maximum rent on trust lands unconstitutional).
In light of these principles, the Supreme Court expressed serious questions about the
constitutionality of applying section 15-1-1 to the school trust:
Given that the Utah Enabling Act and state and federal constitutions
"unequivocally demand" that the trust fund be paid the full value of any
minerals transferred from it, we have serious doubts that the application of
15-1-1 in this case would withstand constitutional scrutiny.
886 P. 2d at 527.
The Supreme Court noted its fundamental rule that it would seek to construe
statutes to avoid running afoul of constitutional prohibitions. Id., citing State v. Wood,
648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982); State v. Bell, 785 P. 2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). It ruled that
the Division and its governing Board had statutory authority to enact rules imposing
interest on unpaid obligations, and determined to harmonize those rules with the
constitutional provisions governing school trust lands. Id.
D.

The District Court Erred in Failing to Consider Constitutional Limits
on the Applicability of the Statute of Limitations in the Case Before It
The District Court committed error by not analyzing the constitutional protections

afforded the school trust and assessing whether the challenged statute abrogates the
state's duty as trustee. R. at 1136; Final Order attached hereto at Addendum A. This
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analysis is required by Van Wagoner, 199 P. 670, which holds that the Utah Constitution
is an "absolute limitation" against which a challenged statute must be measured. 199 P.
at 675-76. See also Consolidation Coal Company, supra, 886 P. 2d at 525; Montanans
for Responsible Use of the School Trust v. State, 989 P. 2d 800, 803 (Mont. 1999)
(constitutional provisions with respect to school trust lands are limitations on the power
of the legislature to dispose of lands); State v. Tanner, 102 N.W. 235 (Neb. 1905)(it is not
within the legislature's power to allow uncompensated transfer of trust assets).
Application of the statute of limitations here would preclude the State, in its
capacity as trustee, from recovering a valuable asset wrongly divested from the school
trust through the void tax sale conducted by Carbon County in 1932. It is not relevant
that the mechanism for this deprivation is indirect, through limitations, rather than a
direct legislative gift of trust assets. It is equally impermissible in the trust context to
"allow that to be done by indirection which could not be done directly." Peterson, 97
P.2d at 607 (quoting Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267 (1903)).
As in Consolidation Coal, application of a statute of general application - in that case the
prejudgment interest statute, here limitations - to the school trust would create a serious
constitutional issue. 886 P.2d at 527. The Supreme Court in Consolidation Coal stated
that the Court's construction of statutes, if possible, should avoid the risk of running afoul
of constitutional prohibitions. Id. Allowing the State to proceed with this action would
eliminate the risk, indeed the certainty, of such a constitutional problem here. In light of
the constitutional obligations of the State with respect to school trust lands, section 78-
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12-2 must be construed as inapplicable to actions to recover such lands for the corpus of
the trust. The Van Wagoner court addressed this issue directly:
We do not contend that the state of Utah has not consented to a bar against
the state in some matters, but we do contend that the lands involved in this
controversy, being school lands, are not within the class of property as to
which the state has consented to be barred, or consented to any title being
acquired by adverse possession. At first blush, section 6646 et seq. might
seem to justify an assumption that the state is barred as to all real property,
but we contend that the nature and purpose of the school grant from the
United States, the wording and spirit of the acceptance of the grant in the
state constitution, the legislative provisions to carry out and utilize the grant
for the purpose for which it was granted, the necessary incidents of this
trust, and the beneficent result of a faithful performance of the trust, are
such that to permit a construction of said sections 6446 et seq., taking away
the substance of the grant, despoiling the school fund, would be an utter
violation of the terms of the trust imposed by the donor and of the solemn
conditions specified in the acceptance of the grant.
199 P. at 672. The Supreme Court subsequently concluded: "Is it conceivable, in the
face of such a constitutional provision, that the Legislature could have intended its
statutes of limitation to apply to such lands?" Id. at 675. Its answer was, of course, no.
In holding that section 78-12-2 applies to the state in this case, the District Court
failed entirely to address the constitutional issues raised by the State. Its failure to
consider constraints on the application of statutes of limitations to deprive the school trust
of lands was erroneous.

27

II.
THE DISTRICT COURT WRONGLY
DISTINGUISHED THIS CASE
FROM VAN WAGONER
A.

The District Court Ruling.
The District Court determined that Van Wagoner was distinguishable from the

case before it. The Court stated that, unlike the adverse possession situation in Van
Wagoner, here the State had "made a conveyance of the property at issue by patent and
the defendants acted under color of title based on that patent and the tax sale that flowed
there from, for more than 70 years." R. 1136; Final Order attached hereto at Addendum
A. The District Court relied on Trail Mountain v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry,
921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996), in which the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals applying section 78-12-2 to a claim asserted by the State for
collection of coal royalties. The Court of Appeals' decision held as a matter of statutory
interpretation that states are generally exempt from statutes of limitation in their capacity
of school land trustees except where the legislature makes the statute applicable to the
state. R. 1126, citing Trail Mountain Coal Company v. Utah Div. of State Lands &
Forestry, 884 P. 2d 1265, 1271 (Utah App. 1994). This holding was based on only the
Court of Appeals statutory interpretation, and did not analyze the constitutional issue.
B.
The Court of Appeals Opinion in Trail Mountain Is Based On an Erroneous
Interpretation of Case Law.
In Trail Mountain, the State was seeking to recover underpayment of coal
royalties from school trust lands under lease. The District Court, relying on Van
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Wagoner, held that no statute of limitations constrained the State's efforts to collect
royalties from past years. The Court of Appeals disagreed. Although it noted the general
exemption from limitations for states acting in their capacity as school land trustee - and
cited Van Wagoner - it held that where the legislature had specified that the limitations
period was applicable to the state, it could be applied to the Division's efforts. 884 P. 2d
at 1271. The Court of Appeals held that the statute on its face applied to the State, and
concluded it was applicable in the case before it. The Court of Appeals' holding relied
on three cases: California State Lands Comm 'n v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 36 (N.D.
Cal. 1981); Laramie County Sch. Dist v. Muir, 808 P. 2d 797, 800-01 (Wyo. 1991); and
State ex rel Cartwright v. Tidmore, 614 P. 2d 14 (Okla. 1983).
Each of the cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in Trail Mountain do stand
for the general proposition that the state may subject itself to the statute of limitations,
notwithstanding the common law rule that time would not run against the sovereign.
However, none of the cases address or analyze the constitutional limits on the
legislature's ability to subject the State's school trust lands to a statute of limitations.
None of the three cases involves school trust lands or the constitutional issues associated
with those lands. The California State Lands case involved tidelands, which pass
incidentally to states at statehood rather than through the "solemn compact" associated
with school trust lands, and for which entirely different rules of law apply. See National
Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands, supra, 869 P. 2d at 919.
Laramie County and Cartwright did not involve lands at all; the former was a
construction defect case brought by a school district, while the latter was a state
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procurement case. The Court of Appeals did not analyze the distinction between claims
involving trust lands - where the legislature's power is constitutionally constrained - and
general government claims involving non-trust lands or other issues where no such
constraints exist. As discussed in Part I above, state constitutional provisions place
substantive limits on the legislature's ability to act with respect to school trust lands. The
Court of Appeals opinion did not address these limits at all, relying instead solely on the
statutory language. Cf. United States v. Fenton, supra, 27 F. Supp. at 816 ("The fund is
sacred and stands out with that special protection, and any statute of limitations, whether
it relates to the State or not, would not apply") (emphasis added). Having failed to
address the critical constitutional issue at all, the Court of Appeals opinion is not on point
and of questionable precedential value to the issue in this case.
C.

The Supreme Court in Trail Mountain Did Not Address the Constitutional Issue
On certiorari from the Court of Appeals in Trail Mountain, the State of Utah failed

to raise the constitutional issue of applicability of statutes of limitation to the State in its
trustee capacity until its reply brief. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals
on the basis of the State's waiver of this issue, without addressing the merits. Trail
Mountain Coal Company v. Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 921 P. 2d 1365, 1371, n. 11
(Utah 1996).
Even if the Court of Appeals' holding in Trail Mountain was relevant to this case,
this Court's constitutional analysis in Van Wagoner is the controlling precedent.
Consolidation Coal Co., 886 P.2d 514, n.4 ("This Court follows its own precedents . . .
and is not bound by decisions of the court of appeals") (emphasis in original); Renn v.
30

Utah State Board of Pardons, 904 P. 2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995). This Court's affirmation
of the Court of Appeals in Trail Mountain did not question, distinguish or overrule Van
Wagoner. The Supreme Court has continued to cite the case in support of school trust
principles in others of the line of coal royalty cases that include Trail Mountain. See
Plateau Mining Co., supra, 802 P. 2d at 729. Van Wagoner remains the controlling
precedent for this case.
D.

Neither the Nature of the Case Nor "Color of Title9' Distinguishes the Current
Case from Van Wagoner.
The District Court distinguished Van Wagoner on the basis that: "The cases cited

in Van Wagoner are all adverse possession cases." R. at 1130, pp. 7, 36-37; Hearing
Transcript attached hereto at Addendum B; R. at 1136; Final Order attached hereto at
Addendum A. The District Court also held that the defendants had "color of title" by
virtue of the void 1912 patent and subsequent tax sale, thereby holding that this case was
distinguishable from a case of adverse possession. The District Court's legal conclusion
and holding was therefore in error, because there is no legal relevance to either adverse
possession or color of title in the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis and holding in
Van Wagoner.
The Peterson and Fenton decisions from Idaho discussed above illustrate that the
constitutional analysis of statutes of limitation in Van Wagoner applies with equal force
to fact patterns aside from adverse possession. Both the Idaho decisions addressed
whether a statute of limitations otherwise applicable to the state applies when the state
trust attempts to collect on mortgage liens. The Peterson court, in holding the statute of
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limitations inapplicable to Idaho's school trust lands, found the reasoning in Murtaugh,
an adverse possession case, applied with equal force in the mortgage lien context:
The underlying reasons of the above holdings, i.e. the existence of the trust
relationship and the necessity for the preservation intact of the public
school funds makes such theories just as cogent, applicable and forceful in
holding the statute of limitations does not apply to a foreclosure action as to
bar adverse possession.
97 P.2d at 607.
The District Court also distinguished Van Wagoner because it concluded that the
defendant in that case had "really no colorable right to the property, other than simply
coming onto the property, fencing it off, raising crops . . . There is no color of title" R.
at 1130, p. 7 (emphasis added); Hearing Transcript attached hereto at Addendum B. The
District Court's determination that color of title was legally relevant to its holding was
erroneous. At the time of the Van Wagoner decision, Utah law provided that anyone who
had occupied a tract of land for five or more years was deemed to have color of title.
Utah Compiled Laws § 5034 (1917). This provision has remained unchanged since; it is
now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4(2)(a). Occupation need not amount to adverse
possession to qualify as color of title. See id. The defendant in Van Wagoner had
occupied the subject lands for many decades, and so by definition did possess color of
title. Color of title does not provide a basis for distinguishing the Mathises' occupancy,
which is based upon the void 1912 patent, followed by an equally void tax sale, from the
adverse possessor in Van Wagoner.
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III.
The District Court's Application of Section 78-12-2
Presumes the Validity of the 1912 Patent and 1932 Tax Sale.
In order to find the statute of limitations applicable, the District Court assumed the
validity of the Mathises' title, determining that they held "under color of title." R at 1130
and R 1136. The District Court's reliance upon the presence of colorable title in this case
to distinguish it from Van Wagoner and to quiet title in the Mathises necessarily assumes
the validity of the 1912 State patent and the validity of the 1927 Carbon County tax
assessment to support the 1938 Quit Claim deed from the County to the Mathises. Both
the patent and the tax sale, as a matter of law, are void, and the Mathises gained no title
from either. See Huntington City v. C W. Peterson, 518 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1974). The
Mathises' claim to the disputed property stems from a 1938 Quit Claim Deed, which in
turn is based on Carbon County's 1932 tax sale of a parcel of property assessed for taxes
in 1927.
By final action taken by the Department of Interior, the State's 1912 patent was
adjudicated void ab initio by the Secretary of the Interior on September 8, 1926. The
1926 invalidation of the 1912 patent is res judicata and remains binding. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held in State v. Bradley Estates, Inc., 223 F.2d 129, 131
(10th Cir. 1955) that as a matter of federal law the prior departmental adjudication of the
mineral character of lands at and prior to the date of official survey is, in the absence of
fraud in the imposition, conclusive in future title actions. See also Cameron v. United
States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920). The final 1926 adjudication voided the entire 1912
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conveyance because title had never left the federal government and the state had no title
to pass.
The 1927 Jones Act, Act of Jan. 25, 1927, ch. 57 § 1, 44 Stat. 1026, codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 870-871, was an additional and separate grant to the state of
known mineral lands. See Jensen v. Dinehart, 645 P.2d 32 (Utah 1982). Thus, in 1927,
after the Jones Act, the Subject Land was vested in the State as school trust lands, and the
parcel was thus within the "constitutional exemption from taxation as property of the
state." Duchesne County, 140 P.2d at 343 (school trust land is "property of the state"
exempt from taxation); Stowell v. State, 115 P.2d 916 (Utah 1941) (tax deed granted by
county was without effect as to any interest which constituted school trust property when
the taxable entity's title failed). If the tax on land for which a tax sale was made is
invalid, "then the sale is void, and the defendant got no title by her tax deed." Huntington
Ci(y, 518 P.2d at 1249.
The Mathises argued below that the doctrine of after-acquired title, codified at
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-10 (2007), applies to the 1912 patent so that the title the state
received in 1927 immediately passed through to the Carbon County Land Company, the
state's original 1912 patentees. In order for after-acquired title to apply, the conveyance
document must contain warranties. Barlow Society v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723 P.2d
398, 400 (Utah 1986) (analyzing Utah statute outlining form of quitclaim deed); Dowse v.
Kammerman, 246 P.2d 881, 882-83 (Utah 1952) (stating proposition that doctrine of
after-acquired title does not apply to quitclaim deeds is "universally recognized");
Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 186 P.2d 965 (Utah 1947). State patents, as a matter of
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"hornbook law/' are quitclaim deeds in nature and contain no warranties. Energy
Transports Systems v. Union Pacific Ry., 435 F. Supp. 313 (D. Wyo. 1977); Beard v.
Federy, 70 U.S. (3. Wall.) 478, 491, (1866); Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co. v. City
of Los Angeles, 217 U.S. 217 (1910) (patent's operation is that of a quitclaim, or, rather, a
conveyance of such interest as the government may possess); Ellingstadv. Alaska, 979
P.2d 1000, 1006 (Alaska 1999); Huntington v. Donovan, 192 P. 543, 547 (Cal. 1920)
(After-acquired title doctrine "does not apply to a government patent").
Additionally, after-acquired title requires privity between the original grantees,
here CLCC, and those asserting after-acquired title, here the Mathises. Kennedy Oil v.
Lance Oil & Gas Co., 126 P.3d 875, 884 (Wyo. 2006); Cox v. Gutman, 575 S.W.2d 661
(Tex. App. Ct. 1978). It may not be invoked by a stranger to the original conveyance
who is claiming through an independent title. General Auto Service Station v. Maniatis,
765 N.E. 2d 1176, 1184 n. 4 (111. App. 2002). This principle follows from the general
rule that a party claiming the benefit of an estoppel must show he was induced to change
his position because of representations in the deed. Dominex, Inc. v. Key, 456 So. 2d
1047, 1057 (Al. 1984). This Court has similarly held that reasonable reliance is a
necessary element of establishing estoppel by deed. Arnold Industries, Inc. v. Love, 2002
UT 133 119, 63 P.3d 721. A tax sale breaks privity. Bradham v. United States, 168 F.2d
905, 907 (10th Cir. 1948) (citing Hussman v. Durham, 165 U.S. 144 (1897)). In
Hussman, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether those claiming title through a void
tax sale can assert any estoppel against previous record owners, and concluded such a
claim cannot stand because the tax sale functions to break privity between the two lines
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of ownership. 165 U.S. at 149-50. Thus, the Mathises cannot claim after-acquired title,
even if the doctrine were to apply to a state patent. The Hussman Court noted that "it is
familiar law that a purchaser of a tax title takes all the chances." Id, at 150. Because the
1912 patent was voided ab initio in an adjudication that is binding on this state's courts,
and because the 1932 tax sale could not pass the State's title, because after-acquired title
does not apply and because the Mathises lack privity to assert the doctrine, the Mathises'
claim of title against the State fails. The County had no title or interest in the Subject
Land to devise.
Although the District Court purported to not reach the validity of either the 1912
State patent or the 1932 tax sale, its determination to apply section 78-12-2 and grant
summary judgment quieting title in the Mathises is implicitly based on the validity of
both of these conveyance documents. Because the 1912 patent and the 1932 tax sale for
1927 taxes, were void, the Mathises do not have any claim, colorable or otherwise, to a
title superior to the State's.
CONCLUSION
Title to the Subject Land vested in the State of Utah on January 25, 1927, and has
not been conveyed since that time. The State is entitled to bring this action to recover
possession of the Subject Land because state statutes of limitation may not
constitutionally be applied to prevent the State, as trustee, from suing to recover land
wrongfully diverted from the corpus of the trust created by the Utah Enabling Act and the
Utah Constitution. The District Court wrongly applied limitations to preclude the State
from maintaining this action to recover the school trust lands at issue here.
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The District Court's holding should be reversed, its order vacated, and this action
remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment quieting title in the State.
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, acting by and through the
SCHOOL & INSTITUTIONAL TRUST
LANDS ADMINISTRATION,
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT
vs.
REX MORRELL MATHIS; JOANN L.
MATHIS-ROSS; WILLIAM DALE MATHIS;
MARK PICKUP; SHAWNDA PICKUP
CAVE; MATHIS LAND, INC, a Utah
corporation; BUCK CREEK, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company; MOUNTAIN
MINERAL RESOURCES, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company; and JOHN DOES 1-10,

Civil No. 050700196PR
Judge Douglas B. Thomas

Defendants.

This matter came before the court on August 30,2007. at 9:00 a.m., for oral argument on
cross motions for summary judgment. Thomas A. Mitchell and Erin M. Arnold appeared for the

plaintiff. Ronald G. Russell and Royce B. Covington appeared for defendants. The court having
reviewed the record herein and considered the arguments presented by counsel, concludes that
the plaintiffs claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann,
§ 78-12-2, which provides a seven-year limitation period for the state in respect to any real
property by reason of the right or title of the state to the same. The court is of the opinion that
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Van Wagoner v, Whitmore, 199 P. 670 (Utah 1921), in
which the court held the seven-year limitations period is inapplicable to the state in an adverse
possession case, is distinguishablefromthe instant case. Here, the state made a conveyance of
the property at issue by patent and the defendants acted under color of title based on that patent
and the tax sale thatflowedtherefrom, for more than 70 years. In Trail Mountain Coal Co. v,
Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court
determined that the seven-year period of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2 applied to a claim by the
state, and affirmed the Utah Court of Appeals' ruling that although "states are generally exempt
from the applicable statute of limitations when acting in their capacity as school land
trustees,, . , an exception to the general rule is triggered when the state itself, through its
legislature, makes the statute of limitation applicable to the state/1 Trail Mountain Coal Co> v.
Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 884 P.2d 1265, 1271 (Utah App. 1994). The court having
based its ruling on the statute of limitations does not reach the issue of the validity of the patent
or the tax sale. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is denied.
2

2. Defendants1 motion for summary judgment is granted.
3. The court hereby grants judgment in favor of defendants on their counterclaim and
hereby quiets title against the plaintiff to the surface of the following-described real property (the
"Property") in Mathis Land, Inc. and to the mineral estate of said Property in Buck Creek, LLC,
as to a one-fourth interest, and Mountain Mineral Resources, LLC, as to a three-fourths interest,
said Property being located in Carbon County, Utah and more particularly described as:
All of Section 36, Township 12 South, Range 10 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
4. The defendants are entitled to retain all payments and compensation previously
received in connection with the Property.
5. The court further decrees that the defendants are entitled to all proceeds, royalties,
and other payments with respect to the Property according to their interests as stated in the
foregoing paragraph 3. The court directs that all funds escrowed in connection with this dispute
at Chase Bank (account number 000001609120785) and Key Bank (account number
440781003775) be released in full to the defendants according to their interests as stated in the
foregoing paragraph 3.
6. The plaintiffs Amended Complaint and all claims therein are hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
7. This Order and Final Judgment resolves all claims and is entered as the final
judgment in this case.

3

DATED this <Tj\h day of

^f\y\r

,2007.

BY THE COURT:

M WAa\0vSl5^rhv>fr^
Honorable Bouglas B. Thomas
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff,

1, Esq. of
PARR WApDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants

4

ADDENDUM B

iiLClj

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO0RT
OF CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH Sfvr:NTH DISTRICT CC
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Case No. 0 5 0 7 0 0 1 9 6 PR
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al,
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Electronically Recorded on
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BEFORE: THE HONORA3LE DOUGLAS 3. THOMAS
Seventh District Court Judge
APPEARANCES
For rhe Plaintiff:

Thomas A. Mitchell
Erin M. Arnold
675 East 500 South
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: 801-538-5100
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Ronald G. Russell
Royce Covington
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Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on August 30, 2007)

3

COURT CLERK: Seventh District Court in Carbon County,

4

State of Utah is now in session.

5

8. Thomas presiding.

The Honorable Judge Douglas

Please be seated.

6

THE COURT: Good morning, folks.

7

MR. MITCHELL: Good morning.

8

MR. RUSSELL: Good morning, your Honor.

9

THE COURT: We are here on the case of State of Utah

10

vs. Mathis. We have the State being represented today by

11

attorney Thomas Mitchell and Michelle McConkie; is that

12

accurate?

13
14

MR. MITCHELL: Your Honor, Thomas Mitchell and this is
Erin Arnold, who will —

15

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Arnold.

We have Kathis

16

being represented today by Counsel, I'll let you —

17

MR. RUSSELL: I'm Ron Russell, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Thank ycu.

19

MR. RUSSELL: This is my —

20

firm.

21

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

22

the first set

23

that I didn't do it twice.

24

today.

25
26

Royce Covington from my

After I missed on

of names on the docket, I wanted to make sure
So thank you all for being here

The time is set for oral argument on a motion for
summary —

cross motions for a summary judgment that have been
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filed in this matter.

2

I have tried to review everything that has been submitted. I

3

will not pretend to Counsel that I know those documents, as

4

well as I'm sure you do, there's a number of documents in those

5

cases.

6

As I have reviewed the pleadings — and

However, it struck me that there is a threshold issue

7

that I think probably needs to first be addressed before we

8

address the issues with respect to the After Acquired Title

9

Statute, get into the applicability of the Jones Act and the

10 J effect of the Jones Act, and the amendments.
11 I

Before we get into any of tnat, I think the threshold

12

issue has to do with the applicability of the statute of

13

limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-2.

14

1 would first like to hear argument on that issue from

15

both sides,

16

have read the cases that you're each relying on, but I want to

17

give you an opportunity to more fully set forth your positions

18

on that issue.

19

1 have reviewed your arguments and your brief, I

I think that issue needs to be addressed first,

20

because that issue may be dispositive as to whether or not

21

I even reach those other issues.

22

arguing those issues first.

23
24

So I would appreciate you

I'll let the State go first.

MR. MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. If I may approach
the bench?

25

THE COURT: You may.

Thank you.

26 I

MR. MITCHELL: Counsel for the defendants have a copy
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as well.

2

if you would turn to tab 6 in the exhibits, It essentially sets

3

forth for you the applicable statute of limitations today, and

4

the applicable statute of limitations in VanWagoner; and as you

5

can see, they are identical.

6

Your Honor, on the statute of limitations question,

VanWagoner is directly on point as to these statutes

7

and as to this plaintiff seeking quite title,

8

being the school trust lands. The lands have been passed

9

the State under the Enaoling Act, Act of Congress, and accepted

10
11

"This plaintiff"
to

pursuant to the terms of the Utah Constitution.
As in VanWagoner, this case is identical in that but

12

for a Constitutional prohibition, there is no question that

13

this statute of limitations would otherwise be applicable to

14

bar the risk cause

15

of action if it's a true tax title case.

We, of course, don't agree in the first instance that

16

it's a true tax title case.

We don't agree that it's a true

17

tax title case because the tax sale, having been brought

18

against property which was not subject to taxation, it's void,

19

just as a tax sale of the State Capitol or a tax sale of this

20

courthouse would be void, and no passage of time would divest

21

this State or this County of it's courthouse by virtue of an

22

erroneous or invalid or void sale.

23

But looking directly at the statute of limitations and

24

looking directly at the VanWagoner case, the State in that case

25

stated to the Court, the sole question is, may the Legislature,

26

by statue of limitations, impose a bar or a barrier to the

~5~

1

recovery of land v/hich was given in trust, given that the Utah

2

Constitution Article 20 Section 1, provides that the State

3

accepts and holds this lane in trust.
If the State — and the State, as part of this promise

4
5

in its Constitution, the acceptance of this land, has said

6

that it will not leave, it you will not allow that; property

7

of the trust to leave, except for the respective purposes for

8

which they have been, or may be granted, donated, devised, or

9

otherwise acquired and; therefore a void tax sale would —

10

and of course, any tax sale of State property would be void,

11

because it's not subject to taxation.

12

That the Court held it is conceivable in the face of

13

such a —

14

face of such a Constitutional provision, that the Legislature

15

could have intended its statute of limitations to apply such

16

lands.

17

been the Legislative intent,

18

is it —

asks the question, is it conceivable in the

It is our solemn duty to hold that such could not have

How, since 1921, the Legislation has never expressed a

19

contrary opinion.

It has simply passed on the same identical

20

language, and has never in any way attempted to address this

21

holding to try and reach a different result.

22

Defense, m

this case, place a great deal of weight

23

on the Trail Mountain case.

24

are a couple of important observations in regard to that. In

25

the first instance, the Ute —

26

overrule its holding in VanWagoner.

Tr.e Trail Mountain Case, there

the Utah Supreme Court did not
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What it held was, that in the context of what was

2 J essentially a commercial dispute, i.e. a contract dispute,
3 I between the trust and the mine company paying the royalties,
4

that in the absence of the Constitution issue having been

5

raised in a timely fashion, it would not disturb the lov»;er

6

Court rule —

7

raise that issue,

8
9

the Appellate Court ruling.

It was toe late to

If the desire to distinguish or desire to overrule its
clear precedent, it could have done so.

The Court does not

10

overrule clear and unambiguous precedent on a Constitutional

11

issue without comment, without any reference to the case it's

12

overruling.

13

The Appellate Court or the intermediate Court of

14

Appeals decision has no precedential value as against the

15

Supreme Court's decision in VanWagoner.

16 I Canyon —

So I think Trail

or Trail Mountain does not provide a basis for

17

ignoring or for applying a different standard where the

18

Supreme Court has spoken so clearly and unambiguously as to

19

this particular statute of limitations, as to this particular

20

type of plaintiff, in this situation of seeking to recover

21

property, which is being adversely claimed under color of the

22

tax title (inaudible), as opposed to purely adverse possession;

23

but again, the elements being more or less the same.

24
25
26

Does the Court have any specific questions on this
issue?
THE COURT: Well, I suppose you just touched on my

-71

primary question, and that is the differences.

I take a look

2

at the case which you were referring to, the VanWagoner case.

3

That's an adverse possession case; and the cases that are

4

cited in VanWagoner are all adverse possession cases, where

5

essentially there is no claim to the property through deed or

6

through color of —

7

other than simply coming onto the property, fencing it off,

8

raising crops, ditching it, that type of thing.

9

color of title.

really no colorable right to the property,

There is no

10

Ky question has to do 'with isn't that factual situation

11

different from the facts of this case where we have an original

12

patent issued in 1912; we then have —

13

whole analysis, but of course, the Sweet decision, actions by

14

the Department of Interior, the Jones Act, the Jones Act

15

Amendment, and then the tax title being issued.

16

title, that tax deed, being in effect now for close to 70

17

years, isn't that different from the facts in the VanWagoner

18

case?

19
20
21

I WOP/t go through the

MR. MITCHELL; Well, yeah, they are —

That tax

the facts are

different in each case, but let me distinguish, if I can.
In this case, the relevant —

the relevant act is

22

the tax sale.

What goes on before goes to why it was State

23

property; why it didn't belong to the Milners and their Carbon

24

County land scheme; why acts had been taken by the United

25

States Government; why there had been investigations by the

26

auditor in the Governor's office to get to the bottom of this

-81

2

—

of all this coal crop.
After that date, after the efforts of the United

3

States, after the efforts of State auditors and investigators,

4

the title being in the State, then the question arises, could

5

a tax sale of property whicn is not subject to taxation, which,

6

of course, the State receives no notice of, the State doesn't

7

receive notice that its property being sold for back taxes?

8
9

Think, for example, if you think about it, if you look
at the front —

1 think it's tab No. 3 in your binder —

you

10

look at the map of the State of Utah, and you look at the blue

II

squares, they are somewhere in the neighborhood of "?,000 plus

12

individual parcels of land held by the trust.

13

only no actual notice to the trust tnat someone is purporting

14

to sell its property at a tax sale, there can't even be any

15

constructive notice.

16

The Supreme Court xn the —

There is not

in a recent case noted

17

that you can't affect the State's property through constructive

18

notice when the State has property everywhere, and the State

19

holds property pursuant to law. The State doesn't go down when

20

it acquires title in its sovereign capacity or in its trust

21

capacity, and file —

22

or at least historically did not file.

In this case, of course, there actually is a 1964 on

23

file in the County record cf the State's title; but under those

24

circumstances, the relevant time to look at this case is from

25

the time there was a void tax sale, ana the holding under that

26

void tax sale.

-9In this case the State 'iad no more notice of Mathis'

1

The fact trtat there

2

claim than i t did in the VanWagoner case

3

was a quit c laim deed out of the County 2»n the 1930 s for one

4 1 parcel among thou sands;, does not provide either actual. or
5

constructive notice to the Stare.
If this was purely an equity case, as opposed to a

6
7

statutory case, you might say, laches, because that's really

8

the heart of what they're arguing.

9

an equitable argument.

They're arguing to you

They're not arguing to you that the

10

statute of limitations can't apply under VanWagoner, because

11

VanWagoner is so express as to the fact that the Legislature is

12

incapable in its legislative capacity of breaching its trust

13

under the Constitution as to these lands.

14

Instead, what they're really arguing to you, and I

15

think, you know, the appeal to their case is, the passage of

16

time.

17

your Honor, is a passage of time in which the State had no

18

notice of this adverse claim to it.

19

there was an adverse claim.

20

The passage of time.

The passage of time in this case,

There's nc evidence that

The activity that went on before is the activity of

21

trying to disgorge property wrongfully transferred, and get it

22

back into the State.

23

quit claim in the 1930's, an independent root of title, which

24

stands and fails on the validity of the tax sale.

25
26

The title to the Mathis' claim is from a

We aren't saying that the tax sale was flawed.
We're not saying that the tax sale failed to comply with some
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1

technicality.

2

it never happened, because there was never the power in the

3

County to sell State property at a tax sale.

4

We're saying it was void out an issue, as though

Because of that, in trutn, setting aside for a moment

5

the fact that this statute can't apply to the trust in the

6

circumstance, it isn't even applicable, because there was

7

no tax sale of the State property.

8

documents were without any legal effect.

9

effect of the quit claim deed was to dispose of any claim the

It never happened.

The

The only a legal

10

County had in the land, and to transfer that, whatever claim

11

the County had, to the Mathis'.

12

title that they held.

13

It did not operate to pass the

So, consequently, in the first instance, this statute

14

of limitations really isn't applicable.

15

really is, is a laches claim.

16

our open brief, and they have not contested that the passage

17

of time, the failure to act of employees of the State, of the

18

trust, of the sovereign, can act to divest the State, the

19

sovereign, the trust of its properties.

20

against the trust by virtue of the passage of time and the

21

failure to act in the abstract of State officials.

What their argument

We've cited in our brief, in

22

Does that help clarify?

23

THE COURT: A little bit.

Laches will not run

I'm a little concerned

24

about the notice issue that you've indicated.

25

you essentially as stating that the State has 7,000 parcels

26

of property that they need to look over; but I'm —

I recognize

I suppose
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I'm struggling to a certain extent with the fact that this

2

particular parcel has been operated now, as I indicated, for

3

close to 75 years; and the State is now claiming we had no

4

idea that this property was being held under this tax sale,

5

or under this claim of ownership until 2004.

6

in reality, what the State is arguing today?

7

I mean, is that,

MR. MITCHELL: The State is arguing that, as alleged in

8

its compiaint, it received —

9

claim for the advent of the attempt by the Mathis' to lease the

10

it became aware of the Mathis'

coal, and it brought its action thereafter.

11

There's no evidence before the Court, or argued, that

12

the State had —

13

tax sale, cr the status of what was in the County records, or

14

'who was physically on the land.

15

of people.

16

that the trust had any actual knowledge of the

Again, 7,COO acres, a handful

You knew, if you think back to the original concept of

17

why you can't adversely possess the sovereign, the theory was

18

that the king owns everything, and the king is out doing what

19

the king does, defending the borders, administrating the law,

20

providing for the public welfare; and that if the king turns

21

his back en this property, and others occupy it, we don't want

22

the king spending his time looking behind his back to see if

23

somebody else is on his property.

24

—

25

point, the trust, which the Legislature has sworn to protect,

26

that because you turn your back en one piece of property among

That he cannot —

the king

in this case the sovereign -- in this case, even more to the
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thousands, that the presence of another under a quit claim deed

2

—

3

received any notice prior to this coal case, that it was being

4

claimed adversely.

5

had been through the adjudication, which had been the subject

6

of the State auditor and the Governor's reports, that a quit

7

claim deed had issued sometime in the heart of the depression,

8

and that thereafter the Kathis' had been using it for ranching

9

purposes.

and there's no notice —

10

there's no evidence that the trust

That this was the same parcel of land which

It wasn't until the coalies, 'which brcug.it it to a

11

higher level of attention, came about, that it was brought to

12

the attention of trust.

13

the real value of the trust was challenged.

14

lost the grazing fees on the land during those period of time;

15

but this was the first time something of real value of the

16

trust was being overtly challenged with the mining of this

17

coal.

18

In truth, it was at that point that
Yes, the trust had

So not only was there no actual laches in the sense

19

of, "Oh, yeah, we know this is going on, and we just can't get

20

around to it," but even if such was the case, "Oh, yeah, we

21

know this is going on, but we've got —

22

can't get around to it," laches would not act to divest the

23

State of title.

24

This is a void sale.

25
26

we're just so busy vie

So, again, this is not a true tax sale case.

Secondly, then, VanWagoner, I think, is expressly
clear on what the values are that are weighed here; and how
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constitutionally tne Court judges what "he Legislature

2

intended.

3

unconstitutional.

4

it will do so; and it did so in this instance by finding that

5

the Legislature did not intend this to apply :o this plaintiff

6

when seeking to recover its property.

7

It doesn't go out of its way to find the statute
It can construe a statute constitutionally,

So I really —

I believe this case can be decided, can

8

be disposed of with the finding that if tax prop —

9

property, it wasn't subject to a tax sale.

if State

If subject to this

10

express —

11

it cannot be applied as to this plaintiff, as to this group of

12

lands.

13

statute is addressed by VanWagoner as to this —

14

land and as to this claim.

if this statute would otherwise appJy on its face,

We think that there's really no ambiguity that this
as to this

15

Does that —

16

THE COURT: One other question, if I might ask — and

is that —

are there still —

17

I don't want to get into the whole argument yet with respect to

18

the after acquired title, but just assuming for the sake of

19

argument at this juncture, because I'm focusing again on your

20

statement that the tax sale really was invalid ab initio; and

21

you're essentially suggesting that that was never a valid sale.

22

If, just for the sake of argument right now, before

23

we get into that, we were to assume that —

24

that assumption, okay? — but if we were to assume that the

25

After Acquired Title Statute applied in this case, then

26

wouldn't the tax sale have been a valid sale?

and I'm not making
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MR. MITCHELL: Absolutely, if after acquired title,

2

property never —

3

this land lept into Carbon County.

4

land, free, clear.

5

for the County tc tax.

6

There was nothing to challenge about the tax sale.

7

tax sale case; no question about it.

8
9

we never got it.

It just is —

or. 1927,

Carbon County held the

State had no interest.

There was something

County taxed it. The sale was proper.
Then it's a

To find out whether such is the case or not, to find
out the answer to that, you have to provide the trust the

10

opportunity to address that issue. VanWagoner says, "We don't

11

—

12

the trust can't even get in the door, because the passage of

13

time, where there's been a quit claim deed and a tax sale

14

out of the County, tne passage of time is sufficient to bar

15

the trust, who the Legislature constitutionally is bound to

16

protect, we will not construe or impute to the Legislature the

17

intend to do so.

18

we won't let this statute be construed in such a way that

Sc I believe even if, cf course, if you find the

19

other, I —

20

even decide this case without havi ng decided the after acquired

21

title case as to wheth er the statu te o:: limii:aticns all ows you

22

to address t hat issue.

23
24

you know, we have a oig problem; but you can't

THE COURT: Ok ay, I think that answers my quest ions.
Thank you.

25

MR. MITCHELL: Tnank you.

26

THE COURT: Mr . Russell?
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2

MR. RUSSELL: Thank you, your Honor.
to be out here.

I —

whoops, excuse me.

It's a pleasure

I've been in front

of Jucge Haliiday many times; and it's nice to meet you this

4

morning.

5

to meet you.

6

obviously a lot of rime to review the materials, and take a

7

look at the case.

8
9

I haven't had that pleasure before, but it's good
It's nice to see, as well, that you've taken

You know, the first thing that struck me about this
case —

and perhaps it's why you're focusing on the statute

10

of limitations first —

11

the facts that come forward.

12

of property that's been in the family for all these years,

13

suddenly when there's an opportunity that's presented by a

14

lease, where the family can now finally make some money off

15

their land, the State swoops in and tries to take it ail away.

is just the inherent injustice of
It's like we've got a piece

16

So we initially looked at that question, and I think

17

— and certainly we submit that the statute of limitations is

18

dispositive of the case; and the other issues are there, and I

19

think car. be dispositive as well, but you don't even really

20

need to reach them because of the way the statue of limitations

21

would operate.

22

I think the Court reallv hits the nail on the head

23

when you say the VanWagoner case, wasn't it different because

24

it was an adverse possession case?

25

because of that.

26

family adversely possessed this property.

It is clearly different

We're not claiming here that the Mathis
That would be a
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different case, and we recognize that there would be a

2

constitutional issue with that if we were making it. So

3

we've never made that claim.

4

The issue is a little different than that, there are

5

two statute of limitations really at play here.

The first

6

—

7

understand what Mr. Mitchell just said, the State's not

8

challenging the procedure utilized in the sale and so on. The

9

reason you have a four year tax title statute of limitations

one is the tax title statute of limitations, and as I

10

is because of that.

11

that what the County did or didn't do in the sales process was

12

defective, but —

13

So that one's around; there's no question about that.

14

It's too late to come back and try to say

and that statute ran four years after 1931.

You still, then —

so you get back, then, to the other

15

statute of limitations, which is 78-12-2, which is entitled,

16

"Actions by the State."

17

person for and respect to any real property or the issues of

18

profits thereof by reason of tiie right or title of the State,

19

the same — " okay, now this is not an adverse possession

20

statute —

21

seven years before any action or other proceeding for the same

22

shall be commenced."

23

Says, "The State will not sue any

"unless one such right or title shall accrue within

Now, the State asserts that it obtained title under

24

the Taylor Act —

or the, excuse me, the Jones Axt in 1927.

25

Seven years was run a long time —

26

interesting is, is that the VanWagoner decision was directly

or after that.

What's
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addressed by rhe Court in the subsequent Trail Mountain case.

2

I just wanted to read this quote, because it's —

in

3

the Court of Appeals decision in Trail Mountain says that "A

4

plain reading of the statute reveals — " and we're talking

5

about the same statute —

6

by the State as a consequence of the State's claim of right to

7

real property or issues of profits derived therefrom."

8
9

"that it applies to actions brought

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court —

well, it cited to

the proposition, VanWagoner, the states are generally exempt

10

from the applicable statute of limitations when acting in their

11

capacity as a scnool, land trusties, but specifically refused

12

to adopt that holding; and in fact found that for the seven

13

year period in question, that the statute of limitations does

14

apply.

15

because they weren't brought up in time; but in fact, the

16

merits were reached.

17

The Court didn't simply refuse to hear the arguments

In the Pine —

Pioneer Investments and Trust, an oia

18

1909 Supreme Court case that we've cited as well, the Court

19

held that, quote, "This section — " the one we're talking

20

about —

21

bringing an action for the recovery of real property claimed by

22

it, unless such action is commenced with seven year —

23

seven years."

"in substance provides that the State is barred from

within

24

Now, in this case, we're not dealing with the situation

25

you had in VanWagcner where you had one party that had received

26

a conveyance frcm the State, another party that was claiming by
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adverse possession, challenging the conveyance that had been

2

made by the State to someone else.

3

This is a situation where the predecessor in interest

4

-- the predecessor in title, the Carbon County Land Company,

5

received a patent.

6

get into that —

7

certainly in 1927, by operation of the Doctrine of After

8

Acquired Title, title vests.

9

They received the patent in 1912. We'll

that whole sequence a little bit more, but

At that point in time, is when a cause of action by

10

the State arose.

11

title doesn't work here.

12

to be utilized -- and we're not going to recognize that; and

13

yes, in fact, the State claims that it owns these sections that

14

were conveyed by patent, without mineral or reservation, prior

15

to 1919, is the relevant date, and we'll —

16

into that —

17

title action then, and it chose not to.

18

If -- it wanted to say that after acquired
If after acquired title is not going

again, we can get

it should have and could have brought a quiet

It's simply stated, our —

simply stated, our position

19

is that it's too late now for the Court —

20

Utah, the Trust Lands Division, to go back now and say, "Oh,

21

well, we're now going to challenge our own conveyance of this

22

property."

23

that.

24

or for the State of

The statute plainly states that the State cannot do

It states that the time period has run.
Again, I think simply stated, our position is this is

25

not an adverse possession case.

26

State challenging its own conveyance of real property that

This is a case brought by the
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occurred a long, long time ago. That: conveyance or property to

2

Carbon County Land Company ultimately resulted in a tax sale of

3

that very land; but it is the conveyance itself that the State

4

made that it is net in a position at this time to challenge

5

because of the operation of the statute of limitations.

6

So the VanWagoner case I think is easily distinguished

7

because it's an adverse possession case; and the Trail Mountain

8

Coal Company vs. Utah Divisions of Lands and Forestry case

9

makes it clear that the statutes that the Legislature says

10
11

apply to the State, do apply to the State.
Just quickly, the other provision, 78-12-33, is sort

12

of tne catch all at the end of the limitations sections. If

13

there's any question again about whether it was intended by

14

the Legislature that the State be precluded from challenging

15

its own conveyance —

16

challenging its own conveyance, says, "Limitations in this

17

article apply to actions brought in the name of, or for the

18

benefit of the State or other governmental entity, the same

19

as to actions by private parties," except under one section,

20

which are asbestos claims, who have no bearing on the case

21

before this Court.

22

net an adverse possession claim, but by

So that's, simply stated, our position.

I think when

23

you cut down to the chase, that's what you get back to, is can

24

the State, at this point in time, challenge the conveyance that

25

it made back in 1912; aud that the statute of limitations has

26

run on that.
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THE COURT: Thank ycu.

2

MR. MITCHELL: May I briefly respond?

3

THE COURT: Certainly.

4

MR. MITCHELL: Your Honor, the defendants have muddied

5

a couple of very important points.

6

muddied is, they talked about the State as though the State

7

is monolithic.

8

applies to the State. The question is, does the statute of

9

limitations apply for this particular plaintiff, the trust.

First in point they've

There's no question the statute of limitations

10

The Supreme Court held in VanWagoner at page 679, "The

11

Constitution declares that such lands shall be held in trust —

12

" the trust lands —

13

be disposed of as may be provided by law for their respective

14

purposes for which they have been or may be granted," quote,

15

end quote.

16

"shall be held in trust for the people to

We emphasize the language just quoted and stated that

17

it was an, quote, "absolute limitation upon the power of the

18

State to dispose of such lands, or permit them to be cisposed

19

of except for the purposes for which they were granted by

20

Congress."

21

reason to change our opinion.

We reaffirm what was there stated; but we find no

22

Then down at the next paragraph, "With this explanation

23

there ought not longer to be any doubt as to the grounds." Now,

24

nowhere in this opinion does the Court say this is a adverse

25

possession case, and our reasoning, our logic, our moral

26

prohibition is limited to adverse possession cases.
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Also, remember, of course, as of the time this case

2

was decideo, tax titles were still very frail things.

3

were constantly being assaulted for formality issues. Remember,

4

the purpose of this statute was to stop the attack upon the

5

procedural problems, which invariably arose in tax titles. It

6

is limited to a specific class of problems; tax titles, and the

7

procedures by which they were gained.

8

They

The Court gees on, "Believing as we did, that by

9

the enabling act, the State was morally ocund because of the,

10

quote, "Sacred obligation imposed upon its public faith," end

11

quote, and believing also that by the provisions of the State

12

Constitution was not only morally, but legally, bound to see

13

that these lands or the proceeds there were devoted to school

14

purposes, the Court was of the opinion the statute of

15

limitations had no applications to the case.

16

There's nothing about adverse possession that's

17

relevant to that logic.

18

case was adverse possession adds nothing to the proposition

19

about what the ability, what the capacity of the Court's —

20

of the Legislature is wnen dealing with this class cf lands.

21

It's —

the fact that —

and that

Finally, the language quoted from the Supreme Court's

22

Trail Mountain decision, where he says, "We disagree, a plain

23

reading of the statute," if you lock in the paragraph above,

24

what is it they disagree with?

25

"Specifically Trail Mountain asserts that the language," quote,

26

"by reason of the right or title of the State to the same," end

They disagree with, quote,
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quote, in 78-12-2, "limits the applicability of the statute

2

to cases where the State sues for the right or title to reai

3

property, it's an adverse possession suit."

4

We disagree.

It's disagreeing with Trail Mountain's

5

argument where the Court of Appeal's about the six-year statute

6

of limitation.

7

saying, "f you apply this, it's the six year, not the four

8

year."

9

That's what it's disagreeing about.

It's

That's what that dispute is.
It does not in any place —

so it does not reach the

10

merits of, is this a VanWagoner case?

It says, "We're not

11

going to address that," specifically.

It does not overrule

12

VanWagoner.

13

before tnis Court.

14

still as applicable today as they were when they were first

15

written.

16

VanWagoner is still the controlling precedent
The underlying purposes of VanWagoner are

THE COURT: Well, let's focus on that for just a

17

moment; and let me throw out a hypothetical to you, and perhaps

18

—

19

to extend the logic of what you've just suggested to me that

20

VanWagoner stands for.

21

I'm not trying to suggest that is this case, but I'm trying

Let's presume that the VanWagoner case has indicated

22

that the State car. always go back to recover property.

23

always do that; and that's what it stand for the premise for.

24

What if we had a situation as —

25

in this case are alleging, but let's assume that we had a

26

situation where the State had deeded property, and let's

It can

similar to what the defendants
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presume that we don't have the Sweet decision, and we don't

2

have all the fallout from that, but the State just deeds the

3

property out.

4

Federal grant, but they do it.

5

Shouldn't have done it under the terms of the

State just deeds tne property out, and somebody buys

6

the property, they use the property, they have the property.

7

Are you suggesting that the VanWagoner case stands for the

8

proposition that it doesn't matter that they would have done

9

that.

What matters is the fact that it's school trust lands;

10

and therefore the State, at any time, can go back and retrieve

11

that property?

12

MR. MITCHELL: No, I'm not arguing that, your Honor.

13

THE COURT: Okay, and I realize that was a considerable

14

extension of your argument —

15

MR. MITCHELL: Right —

16

THE COURT: -- but I want to —

17

MR. MITCHELL: -- but that is the box the defendants

18

are trying to put themselves in; and they're doing that by

19

saying, "Well, there was this deed in the form of a patent,"

20

and that the Mathis' are entitled to the benefit of that

21

patent.

22

Well, one, without getting into the quit claim aspect

23

of it, that's not true; and ever, more to the point, they have a

24

separate chain of title.

There is no bonafide purchaser, as is

25

implicit in your example.

There is no bonafide purchaser for

26

value who intervenes in this case.

This is a case where, if
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you will, the Mathis' are a straydee, a stranger, a title that

2

comes out of nowhere.

3

THE COURT: Well, is that accurate?

I mean, don't they

4

get their —

5

earlier?

6

1912 conveyance to the CCLC?

7

this conveyance coming in from — or through the patent; and

8

isn't it the CCLC, then, that fails to pay their taxes under

9

that, and —

10

and doesn't this go back to what we discussed

Don't they get their rights flowing from the original
In other words, the CCLC, we have

MR. MITCHELL: Only if, by operation of after acquired

11

title, that CCLC held the property; but even then, even then,

12

their title is a new and independent title.

13

derivative of; it is a new and independent title whose basis

14

begins with the tax sale.

15

Tax title is not

THE COURT: I suppose, my question, the reason why I'm

16

focusing on that 1912 due deed isn't necessarily to adjudge

17

whether or not there -was after acquired title, but to focus a

18

little bit on the notice that would have been out there to the

19

State.

20

You've suggested today that the State would have no

21

notice that there was being any claim to this property; and yet

22

they have their own grant back in 1912. Then there's also, of

23

course, the tax deed that occurred at the later date.

24

what I'm struggling with, is this suggestion that the State has

25

no notice, in light of the fact that we have these two deeds

26

out there.

That's
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MR. MITCHELL: Well, you have the original patent;

2

and it was that patent which was the notice tot he Federal

3

Government to bring CCLC into Court, into the Administrative

4

Court, and to adjudicate whether at the time the State

5

purported to sell it —

6

time the State would have acquired title, the property was

7

known mineral in nature.

8
9

or ever, nore to the point, at the

The party who received the patent from the State of
Utah, was present, had the opportunity to be heard, present

10

evidence, make argument, call witnesses, and contest this

11

underlying fact as to the validity of the patent, because

12

the validity of the patent is dependent upon whether or not

13

the State of Utah received that (inaudible) under the enabling

14

act.

15

So as to the party who received the patent, they

16

receive a title dependent upon whether or not the State of

17

Utah had title to pass, and they were able to litigate that.

18

They received a final appealable judgment.

19

not appealed; it became final.

20

That judgment was

As of that point in time, both the State and Carbon

21

County Land Company knew that title rested in the Federal

22

government.

23

publicized, occurred.

24

take any action, to say, "We're paying taxes because it's

25

ours under after acquired title"?

26

file saying, "As to this particular patent, after acquired

Thereafter, the Jones Act, which was highly
Did Carbon County make any noise,

Is there a letter in the
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title should pass to us from Carbon County Land Company"? None.

2

Carbon County Land Company knew that their title had

3

ceased.

4

longer had an interest.

5

the land they have, and particularly during the depression,

6

all the lanes under back taxes roll, simply dealt with it as,

7

the paper goes out, the taxes come in or they don't come in.

8

If they don't come in, we have a tax sale.

9

redemption.

10

They ceased to pay taxes on a land in which they no
The County, understandably, with all

Did anybody redeem?

It's subject to

Nobody redeemed.

It's

availaole for the County to sell.

11

Do they ask themselves, could this have been Jones Act

12

land?"

13

about who had notice, we know that prior to the leases having

14

been issued for the coal that's in dispute here, and the land

15

that's in dispute here, that in 1964, pursuant to congressional

16

action, to try and deal with the fact that you have all this

17

land, which has been the subject of ail these State and Federal

18

actions, which are dispositive as to their status, there's

19

nonetheless, nothing filed in the counties where the lands

20

reside.

21

Of course they don't, understandably so. When we think

As a result of that, the United States started to

22

issue its own patents.

23

if you think back on it, part of that whole (inaudible) period

24

of trying to clean up the records on the public lands —

25

finally issues the patent to the State of Utah for this land.

26

Finally, in 1964 -- and this is really,

What does that patent say?

it

It says, "This land comes
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to the State of Utah pursuant to the Act of January 1927," the

2

Jones Act.

3

it records it.

4

in bulk.

5

claim from 1964 on; and that was the Mathis'.

6

It is recorded.

As soon as the State receives it,

It recorded thousands of these.

Sent them our

We do know who did have actual notice of the adverse

They did not come to this Stare and say, "What is this

7

patent under the Jones Act? What is this claim of title under

8

rhe Jones Act you're filing from the United States Government?"

9

So the State of Utah was not taking any action to lie in the

10

bushes and wait to see if seme coal opportunity showed up. The

11

State of Utah, as soon as it did become aware that tnere was a

12

conflict, took action.

13

There really is not an equitable basis.

This is not a

14

case where estoppel —

15

to the Mathis' that the Mathis' relied on, because it was made

16

to them and asked them to do something in reliance thereon.

17

It's just the opposite.

18

there was a representation by the State

As of 1964, a statement was made on the public records

19

as this land of the State of Utah did claim it, and claimed it

20

under the 1927 Act.

21

sort of case that might otherwise trouble you, I think.

So it's a very different case than the

22

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

23

that were new that were raised, Mr. Russell.

24

that, and then give Kr. Mitchell a final reply.

25
26

There were a few items
I'll let you do

MR. RUSSELL: A couple of items were raised, your
Honor, that sort of touched on the rest of the case, but I

-281

think are important to understand, because it: does bear on the

2

statue of limitations.

So if I might approach the oench?

3

THE COURT: You may.

4

MR. RUSSELL: I also created a handout.

Some of these

5

are a little bit duplicative of —

6

gave you, but a couple letters here that are not.

7

where he finisned.

8
9

I think of wnat Mr. Mitcnell
Let me start

The patent that was issued in 1964 was a confirmatory
patent, which is done routinely.

It relates back.

It's

10

irrelevant, quite frankly.

11

State claiming present ownership, it's a United States finally

12

getting around to formally granting to the State the Lands that

13

were passed either under the Enabling Act or under the Jones

14

Act,

15

It's not an indication of the

Let me refer the Court, in this packet that I've just

16

handed to you, you'll see a couple of letters.

17

is under Tab 3, which is a letter that's —

18

1929 —

19

this is why the Statute of Limitations really has to apply

20

here.

21

possession being claimed based on a period of time; but we have

22

a conveyance that's been nade that has a legal effect that the

23

Court —

24

The first one

that written in

see, these are letters that are contemporaneous; and

This is not, again, a situation where we've got aaverse

that the State chose not to challenge at the time.
We've heard argument about notice, I'm not quite sure

25

that that's relevant, but this is not a Bonfield purchaser

26

case; this is not a —

those issues really have nothing to do
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with it.

I thin* trie issues are before the Court.

2

If you'll look at this letter, this is written Dy the

3

State Land Beard of Utah, which is the predecessor to the

4

present day SITLA, the State Institutional and Trust Lands --

5

THE COURT: And this is under tab 4; did you say?

6

MR. RUSSELL: Tao No. 4, yes.

7

THE COURT: Thank you.

8

MR. RUSSELL: Ana I'm also puzzled by the notion that

9

the State of Utan is not a party here, because that's what the

10

complaint says.

11

the State Trust Lands Divisions.

12

State of Utah.

13

of the limitations apply against the State of Utah and its

14

agencies.

15

It's the State of Utah acting by and through
So it's a division cf the

I believe that the statutes are clear that all

Back to this letter, after the Jones Act was passed,

16

the State Land Board —

17

realizing that, well, wait a minute.

18

title to those sections that were of known mineral character,

19

now vest in the State.

20

this one, where there was a conveyance made without a

21

reservati.on of mineral s?

22

the State Land Board of Utah is now
The Jones Act says that,

What does that do with sections like

Because if yo u look at the Jcne s Act, it says that

23

after — with respect to those sections that go to the State

24

under the Jones Act of known mineral cha racter, the State

25

has to — it can't convey the minerals.

26

minerals.

It has to lease the

The Federal Government in its paternalistic wisdom

-3Cwas trying to prevent the states from conveying away state
trust lands, for the benefit of the school children.
So, anyway, back to this letter, this -- the State
Land Board points out to the Commissioner in the General Land
Office -- if you're iust above the quoted language, it says,
"In 1919, our State Legislature, Chapter 107, Session laws of
Utah, enacted

a law requiring that all sales of State lands

thereafter must contain a reservation of minerals by the State,
providing for the lease of minerals.

However, any sales made

by the State prior to 1919 were not subject to a mineral
reservation in the State.'
Then he goes on tc quote the afer acquired title
statutes. Says, ''After acquired title inures to prior grantees,
if any person shall hereafter convey any real estate by
conveyance, purporting to convey the same, a fee simple and
absolute, and shall not at the time of such conveyance have
legal estate and (inaudible) estate, but shall thereafter
acquire the same.

The legal estate subsequently acquired

passes."
So then he sets up the fact on the next page that the
statute represents a legislative declaration of the Doctrine of
Estoppel by D.

In the next paragraph under the decision, this

has been called to cur attention.

"This doctrine appears to

be binding upon States anc their transactions, as well as upon
individuals.

The result of the application of the doctrine,

wouldn't ordinarily — " "would ordinarily, therefore, result in
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the vesting in the States, prior grantee, any title, which the

2

State of Utah acquired under the Act of January 25Ln, 1927, the

3

Jones Act.'

4

So then he asked the question, "Okay, well, what do we

5

do now, because the Jones Act says we can't convey minerals.

6

We've already issued these patents that do convey the minerals,

7

but the Jones Act — how do we resolve this quandary?"

8

what eno.ed up being resolved in the 1932 amendment, which we'll

9

talk about.

10

That's

My point there is, the State knew in 1927 that after

11

acquired title had occurred, that that created an issue with

12

the minerals, and the mineral estate.

13

letter in the sequence, which I've got under Tab 5, this again,

14

this is a letter from the State geologist for the State Land

15

Office; and these records are right out of the SITLA's files, A

16

—

17

they're asking him for his advise, "What do we do about these

18

proper ties that are :»n this category?"

19

If you look at the next

E. H. Burto, who's writing now to the State Land Board, and

The conveyances pr:Lor to 1919, without a reservation

20

of the mineral estate, that involves State's school trust

21

lands, how are we going to deal with this, because we've got

22

after acquired title in the State of Utah?

23

If you just ~- I don't want to read th.LS whole letter

24

to the Court, but he recites all of the history

25

two re commendations.

26

after describing agai.n -what we've just gone through, it says,

Then he gives

If ycu go ahead to page A of the letter,
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"Under — " after describing after acquired title and the

2

history and how we got to where we are with conveyances prior

3

to 1919, he says, "I believe two courses of action are open to

4

correct the situation."

Do you see that?

5

THE COURT: Yes.

6

MR. RUSSELL: No. 1, "To endeavor a higher an act — "

7

or "to have an act passed by Congress quieting title in the

8

various states to all school mineral lands sold prior to the

9

Act of January 25, 1927,"

10
11

That would be like this one. That's

what they did; they ended up getting Congress to pass an Act.
Then he talks about —

he coesn't think that's

12

possible.

13

he says, "For the State of Utah proceed with the classification

14

of all school, section tracks as to mineral characteristic

15

which was sold without mineral reservation to the State."

16

Then he discusses the fact that you have to essentially bring

17

quiet title actions on ail of these sections,

18

Congress probably won't do that, but in No. 2, then,

So, the State of Utah knew about this.

This — the

19

trust land —

20

back at -- contemporaneous with the passage of the Jones Act,

21

with the amendment that was done by Congress in 1932 to address

22

this issue.

23
24

or the State Land Board knew about this issue

The whole point of our argument about the Statute of
Limitations is not that we've adversely possessed this property

25 I since that point in time, which is, you can't get title by
26

adverse possession, but the State conveyed this parcel. There
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was a conveyance by patent that subsequentiy resulted in that

2

party losing its interest by a tax sale, that then results in

3

our chain of title, no question about that; but it is simply

4

too late, the tinie period nas passed for the State to be

5

cringing the actions, challenging its own conveyance of

6

lands that occurred back in 1912 as then operation of an

7

after acquired title in 1927 by the Jones Act.

8

9

So this is not some -- a case where after acquired
title applies.

I think the Court — the example the Court

10

gave hits the nail on the head, that if the statute were to

11

be interpreted, the limitations period, as the State is now

12

arguing, any conveyance made by the State of Utah of a trust

13

land, would be subject to a challenge at any time, without

14

limitation, because somebody in a different administration,

15

10, or 15 or 20 or 100 years later, couid look back and say,

16

"You know, there was fraud in that transaction," or "We aon't

17

think that the purpose it was conveyed for was proper.

18

used for something other than benefitting the school children.

19

"The person got a better deal than he or she should have."

20

That's why we have a limitations period.

It was

You need to

21

have certainty in title so that people can get on with life,

22

that they can understand the property has been conveyed, they

23

can make valid use of the property; and there's a seven year

24

period for the State that if it wanted to challenge some

25

conveyance, it could have, and it didn't do it.

26

THE COURT: Thank you.

That's our —
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1

MR. MITCHELL: —

2

THE COURT: Just for your information, Mr. Mitchell,

rebuttal for that.

3

I'm taking that argument against: focusing primarily on the

4

notice issue that would have been to the State.

5

words/ I'n not trying to get into ruling on the applicability

6

of the Jones Act and after acquired title; but I'm focusing

7

primarily on that rebuttal as notice to the State.

In other

8

MR. MITCHELL; I understanc tnat, your Honor.

9

THE COURT: Okay.

10

MR. MITCHELL: That's why his characterization of that,

11

I thin*, is misleading at best, and here's why.

12

July 17th, 1929 by Mr. Oldroyd is not a position by the State of

13

Utah.

14

called to our attention — " Mr. Oldroyd, not appearing to be

15

a lawyer, not saying —

16

really thought it was the case —

17

our Attorney General, or the attached briefs, or the attached

18

legal analysis.

19

"Send this letter," and he said, "You —

20

you're the chief legal officer of the land for these issues.

21

What do you think?

The letter of

What it says is, "Under the doctrines which have been

which would have been helpful if he
that tnis is the opinion of

Rather, clearly someone got to him and said,
you're the solicitor,

We've been told we have a quandary here."

22

Cf course, we knew what he said to that.

23

"Nonsense;" but even mere to the point, the real purpose in

24

the letter comes down to the issue —

25

distinction to keep in mind.

26

Jones Act there were a class cf lands whose status was unknown,

He said,

and here's the important

There's no question after the
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WHO'

2

lands.

s title was uncertain.
The lands —

These lands were not among those

the land in this case.

3

THE COURT: Because of the Department of Interior —

4

MR. MITCHELL: It had been adjudicated.

5

THE COURT: Because of the Department of Interior, is

6

ivhat you're suggesting?

7

MR. MITCHELL: Because of the Department of Interior.

8

No quiet title action was necessary.

9

the United States.

Title had been quieted in

It was the United States to dispose of, as

10

of that point in time.

11

land, everyone who had received a patent had been involved.

12

It was litigated, it was acjudicated, it was final, it was res

13

judicata.

14

Everyone who had an interest in that

The issue in this case is, what happened afterwards?

15

What happened when the Mat his' got a quit claim deed?

16

there a tax sale or wasn't there a tax sale?

17

claim pass anything, or didn't it pass anything?

18

there's some irregularity.

19

County to se 11?

20

The verdict letter

Was

Did the quit
Not whether

It's was there anyt hing for the

when read in full context, I

21

think, does a good job of c;Larifying which lands are at issue.

22

Of course, there would have been no reason this case as to

23

these lands to have brought a quiet title action , because the

24

quiet title action had already been done.

25

THE COURT: I don't think so.

26

MR. MITCHELL: Thank you.

Anyth ing else?
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THE COURT: I tried to listen very carefully to the

2

arguments that have been presented today; and I suspect that

3

these are issues that are ultimately going to need to be sorted

4

out through the Appellate Court, but T'ni going to give you rr.y

5

best shot at it today.

6

I see a significant difference in the VanWagoner

7

case and the case before the Court.

8

do with the nature of the proceeding.

9

was an adverse title case, where tne parties had —

That difference nas to
The VanWaccner case
I say

10

"the parties" — where essentially the Khitmore in that case

11

would had gone onto the property, and under no claim of title,

12

no claim of any right whatsoever, had essentially adversely

13

possessed it.

14

property.

15

the party, the Whitmcre party would have gone onto the property

16

and held the land.

17

There was no colcr of any right to be on the

There was no deed of any type in that case, whereby

In the present case, we have, I think it's fair to

18

say, a fair]-V complex series of events that transpi red; and we

19

have, in 1912, the patent the t issued to the CCLC.

20

pa tent that was issued by, I be]ieve, the Governor of the State

21

of Utah, nvy recollection; am I accurate on that?

That was a

22

MR. RUSSELL: Yes.

23

MR. MITCHELL: Yes.

24

THE COURT: And that, in fact, that documen t is

25

certainly a claim of right to the property.

26

that we late r have other events that are occurring.

I acknowledge
We have
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the Sweet decision that occurs in 1918, We have the Utah

2

Legislature's enactment of the statute in 1919.

We have the

3

Department of the Interior actions that occur.

We have the

4

Jones Act, and we have the Jones Act amendments.

5

a tax deed,

6

takes the property and sells it.

7

Then we have

tax sale that occurs where the County essentially

Then we have the parties who purchased the property

8

at the tax sale.

9

the property, using it, as acknowledged now by the State for

10

grazing and ranching purposes for a period of 65 plus years,

11

and the State has acknowledged today that we may have lost

12

some grazing fees, we may have lost some grazing revenue, but

13

essentially there has been continual occupancy on that property

14

under the color of that deed.

15

Under the color of that 6ee6t

staying on

So I take a look at the statute of limitations, and I

16

think this case is substantially different than that adverse

17

possession claim, given the history of the titles in this case,

18

given the history of what has occurred.

19

Vie have the defendants in this case who've occupied

20

that property under the color of title and under the tax deed,

21

which flow from the 1912 patent.

22

disputes regarding that; but my point is, is that they are

23

certainly on that property with a colorable interest, with

24

color of title.

25

language to use; but I'm simply suggesting there's a deed

26

there that they're basing it upon.

I recognize there's lots of

I don't know if that's the appropriate

I see that as being a very
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significant difference, and they're occupying it for a long

2

period of time.

3

So as a consequence I then take a look at the statute;

4

and it appears to me that the language is fairly clear as it

5

applies to the State.

6

any person for or in respect to any real property or the issues

7

or profits thereof by reason of the right or title of the State

8

to the same, unless one, such right or title shall have accrued

9

within seven years before any action or other proceeding for

Section "78-12-2, "The State will not sue

10

the same shall be commenced or to the State or those from whom

11

a claim shall have received the rents and profits of such real

12

property or sozie part thereof within seven

13

years."

I don't seen how those criteria have been satisfied

14

in this case.

15

and the Supreme Court's decision upholding this portion of the

16

Court of Appeals judgment.

17

the Court —

18

fully briefed; and I recognize the State's claim with respect

19

to that.

20

I am mindful of the Court of Appeals decision

I'm also mindful of footnote 11 in

Supreme Court's decision that indicates it wasn't

I believe when I take a look at the language in the

21

Court of Appeals decision, where they state as follows, "It

22

is true that States are generally exempt from the applicable

23

statute of limitations when acting in their capacity of School

24

Land Trust State."

25

along and, even though they quoted the VanWagoner decision,

26

they stayed.

So they throve that out; but then they come

"However, and exception to the general rule is
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tri ggerea when the State 2.tself, through its Legislature ma ices

2

the statute of lim itation applicable to i the

3

State."

The Utah Legislature ha s specif.Leal iy included the

4

State of Utah within the applicable statute of limitation,

5

Then the case goes on to quote those two provisions that I

6

just read.

7

this section did not sufficiently indicate the Legislature's

8

intent to include the State within the statute of limitations."

9

The Court of Appeals goes on to state, "As if

Another section provides that, "The limitations in

10

this article apply to actions brought in the name of, or for

11

the benefit of the State or other Governmental entity, the

12

same as to actions by private parties." That's, of course,

13

the statute that Mr. Russell referred me to a fev; moments ago.

14

Then, the Court of Appeals concludes, "Given the

15

statutory scheme, we can only conclude that the Legislature

16

intended to subject the State to the applicable statute of

17

limitations."

18

appropriate to this case, given the history and the facts of

19

—

20

colorable claim of right through the tax deed, and perhaps even

21

flowing back to the 1912 deed or patent —

22

it as a deed, \out it's the patent that I'm referring to, and I

23

think everyone understands that

24

I think that is language that I believe is most

as to what has occurred, given the fact that there was the

1 fur*:her believe that the 65 year

I keep referring to

— 65 plus years

25

of occ upancy under the tit].e of that deed, and the State 's

26

acknow iedgment, that the St.ate would have been entitled to
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the rents from grazing cr something from the grazing rights

2

associated

3

the State is essentially suggesting today that we have lost

4

out for a period of 65 years on these grazing rights that would

wirh chat further cuts against the State, because

have been associated with the lane; and if they would have lost
out on that, if they nave lost those rights, then we're simply

7

talking about a question of magnitude in this case.

8

not we're talking about grazing rights or mineral rights, the

9

legal principle should be the same.

Whether or

10

So based upon all of those facts, it's my best shot

11

today that the statute of limitations does apply as a bar to

12

the State's action to recover the property from the defendants

13

in this case; and accordingly, I'm going to deny the State's

14

motion for summary judgment.

15

I suppose I'm granting the defendant's motion for

16

summary judgement, only to the extent that it applies to the

17

State's claim.

18

quiet title as opposed to the whole world, because the whole

19

world doesn't have notice in this case; but as to the State's

20

claim, in this case.

21

In other words, I'm not suggesting that there's

I think that's probably the best way to frame that

22

to allow you to get before the appropriate —

23

that probably needs to be addressed and solved by the appellate

24

Courts, and I acknowledge that.

25
26

MR. MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor.
it.

We know you worked hard en this.

this is an issue

We appreciate

We appreciate your
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effort.

2

THE COURT: Thank you.

3

MR. MJTCHEI,iL: So in gr ant ing their motion for summary

4

judgment

5

today, can that be issued as a fin al order so that can br-ing

6

an appeal —

disposing cf the* matter, as a pra ct;.cal matter for

7

THE COURT: Yes.

8

MR. MITCHELL: -- even though other issues remain?

9

THE COURT: Well, let's talk about what those other

10

issues would be.

What is it that I'm not —

11

MR. RUSSELL: I think tnat that disposes of all of

12

the claims in the case. There is a fund of money that has

13

accrued that the parties have placed in an escrow pending

14

the resolution of this outcome.

15

Defendants, obviously that fund of money's available, unless

16

something else is either agreed upon, or —

17

an appropriate motion is made that that money not be released.

18

That's not before the Court today. but we —

19

order, hopefully, and have Mr. —

20

By ruling in favor of the

I don't know -- if

I will prepare an

THE COURT: I was going to request that you do that,

21

Mr. Russell, please, and feel free to enhance the language.

22

I've tried to express it as best I could today, but you're

23

certainly not —

24

MR. RUSSELL: Right, I —

25

THE COURT: —- bound by my cumbersome words today. Let

26

me phrase it that way.
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2

MR. RUSSELL: The effect of the Court's order is tc
dispose of the case —

3

THS COURT: Yeah.

4

MR. RUSSSLL: — and I'll prepare an order that

5

accomplishes that.

6

appealable —

7

It should be a final order so that this

THE COURT: And that's -- I had intended it to be

8

just that.

9

disposing of in the case.

10

Z just was uncertain as to what issues 1 was not

MR. MITCHELL: Well, I agree in part with Mr. Russell.

11

I believe it's a final orcer for the purposes of appeal. As

12

a practical matter, it is incumbent upon us tc seek further

13

order with regard to the funds in escrow.

14

but the order should reflect that not having —

15

that this matter was dispositive, should reflect tnat all —

16

that no other issues were addressed in the process —

17

THE COURT: That's correct.

18

MR. MITCHELL: —

19

THE COURT: In other words —

That is correct;
the appealing

and that this was in the —
and here's something that

20

I think is very important.

21

variety of issues that I did not reach.

22

suggest today, that I believe the Court of Appeals couldn't

23

reach those; and I don't believe anyone would t.nink that the

24

Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court —

25

body were to handle this case on an appeal —

26

to consider all of your arguments that are contained in the

You have raised in your briefs a
I'm not trying to

which ever appellate
would net be able

-43edge those issues have
I chink both of you rfould
*
acknowl

1

brief.

2

been properly presented before this Court , and have been r aised

3

in the proceedings below, so to speak.

4

MR. MITCHELL: Okay.

5

THE COURT: So if that's your question —

6

MR. MITCHELL: Well --

7

THE COURT: — Mr. Mitchell, then I think you've

8

preserved those issues —

9

MR. MITCHELL: Yes.

10
11

THE COURT: -- to argue them on appeal, if that's what
you're suggesting.

12

MR. MITCHELL: I simply want the record clear that

13

whether the Appellate Court determines that they can decide,

14

as a matter of law, those matters, that they rule in our favor

15

on the other; or whether they return it to this Court for

16

further proceedings, that these issues were not disposed of

17

oy you toaay.

18

you do not reach them reaching this --

19
20

You do net need to reach them to reach this —

THE COURT: Correct, correct.

In other words, I relied

on the statute of limitations as the basis.

21

MR. MITCHELL: Right.

22

THE COURT: There's no question about that; and that's

23

the basis

24

getting to those other issues, you're accurate.

that I'm reJying upon for my decision today.

25

MR. MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor.

26

THE COURT: For reasons of, I suppose, judicial

I'm not
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restraint, I don't see any reason why I need to reach those

2

issue and rr.ake comment on then, when I'm using the statute of

3

limitations as the basis forrayruling today.

4

MR. MITCHELL; I understand that.

5

MR. RUSSELL: And I understand that, and I will make

6

the order reflect that the Court's decision is based on the

7

statute of limitations —

8

THE COURT: Correct.

9

MR. RUSSELL: — and the Court did not, as a result,

10

reach those other issues —

11

THE COURT: Correct, tnat's accurate.

12

MR. RUSSELL: — that were raised; and that doesn't

13

preclude either party from raising an appeal that the Court

14

should have —

That's accurate.

15

THE COURT: Right.

16

MR. RUSSELL: — granted the motion on the other

17

grounds.

18

THE COURT: Correct.

19

MR. RUSSELL; Certainly r or should not have, on the

20

other grounds, as the case may be.

21

THE COURT: Correct.

Exactly.

All right.

22

MR. RUSSELL: Thank you r your Honor,

23

MR. MITCHELL: Thank yo*j, your Honor.

24

THE COURT: Thank you.

Well argued, v/eli pr esented

I appreciate the efforts of Counsel in puttin'g this

25

case.

26

together .

It' s been very, very helpful as I' ve gone through.
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1

I know that you've wor ked very, very ha rd in putring this ce.se

2

togethe r, and I apprec iate your efforts .

3

being here today.

Thank you ail for

4

MR. RUSSELL: Thank you, your H onor.

5

MR. MITCHELL: Thank you , your Honor

6

THE CLERK: Ai 1 rise,

7

{Hearing cone iuded)
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